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2ABSTRACT
The creation  of  fully  funded,  privately  managed  pension  systems  may have
significant  positive direct effects on  savings, growth,  and welfare.  However,
the indirect link, via  capital market  development,  may be as important.  This
hypothesis  is  verified  with  evidence  from  emerging  economies  that  have
recently engaged  in such reformns  with a  focus on  Chile, Argentina and Peru.
There  is  abundant  qualitative  and  anecdotal  evidence  that  relates  pension
reform with the  accumulation  of "institutional  capital", with the existence  of
an adaptive  legal  framework,  with  increased  specialization,  transparency  and
integrity and  even with better corporate  governance.  Evidence  of increased
financial  innovation  is  also  found  while  there  is  little  evidence  of  bank
disintertnediation.  In  addition,  time-series  and  panel  data  evidence  is
generally  consistent with the following hypothetical effects:  a reduction in the
cost of capital; lower security-price volatility;  and higher traded volumes.  The
evidence  suggests  that the  indirect channel  via  capital market  development
may have important implications for economic growth and productivity.
JEL classifications  G23, 054, 016.
Keywords: Pensions, Reform,  Capital Markets, Emerging Markets, Economic Growth
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4PENSION REFORM AND CAPITAL MARKETS:
ARE THERE ANY (HARD) LINKS?
I.  INTRODUCTION
The interest  in pursuing  pension  reform  shown by multinational  organizations,  developing
countries  and economists  around the world, assumes  that privatization  of social  security, and more
specifically,  the creation  of fully-funded  privately-managed  pension  systems  has  important positive
effects  on welfare.  In particular,  it has been  argued that pension  reform improves  macroeconomic
stability  by  reducing  the  political  and  demographic  pressures  of  the  standard  "pay-as-you-go"
systems,  and  by inducing  fiscal  reform  during  the  transition.  In  addition,  funding  requirements
associated  with  pension  reform  may  help  increase  savings,  fueling  economic  growth  and
productivity.  Pension  savings will increase  total savings if there are liquidity constraints  that do not
allow  individuals to  borrow against  future pensions.  Recent  evidence  suggests  that this  effect may
be more important than previously  thought for developed  countries.!  However,  other findings show
that  the  direct  effects  of pension  reform  on  savings  is  ambiguous  and  sometimes  empirically
unimportant.2
An  increasing  number  of  studies  looking  at  the  impact  of  financial  development  on
economic growth, productivity and savings,  have  cited the possibility that pension reform may have
an additional desirable through a positive impact on capital market development.  The existence of a
positive  effect  of  capital  market  development  on  growth  has  its  main  theoretical  support  in
endogenous growth models, whereby more liquid and efficient  stock markets  provide the incentives
for  long-run  investments,  thus  increasing  economic  growth.  Empirical  evidence  by Levine  and
Zervos  (1998),  Rousseau  and Wachtel  (1998)  and Arestis, Demetriades  and Luintel  (2001)  support
the validity  of this channel, although  the latter believe  that the positive  effect  of stock markets  on
growth has been  exaggerated.
See Poterba et al (1996).
2 See Coronado (1998), Morande  (1998), Hachette(1998).
5Therefore,  in  addition  to  the  direct  effect  that  pension  reform  may  have  on  growth  and
savings,  the  creation  of a  fully-funded,  privately-managed  pension  system  may  also  accelerate  the
process of capital market  development,  improving growth and welfare.  The main  question  that we
ask in  this  paper is  therefore  the  following:  If pension  funds  simply  happen  to substitute  other
sources  of private  savings,  why would  this reform  have  any beneficial  effect  on economic  growth
and  productivity?  Furthermore,  pension  reform  has  been  accompanied  in  most  cases  by  other
concurrent reforms, which have their own effects.  The main  purpose of this paper is to verify  the
hypothesis  that  pension  fund  reform  signifcantly  affects  the  functioning  of capital  markets  after
controlling for other reforms.
Many economists  have asked similar questions,3 so one of the contributions  of this  paper is
to  synthesize  the  main  hypotheses  that  relate  capital  market  development  with  pension  reform,
discuss  their  validity,  and  perhaps  posit  new  ones.  We  also  analyze  the  extent  to  which  the
qualitative  evidence is consistent with  these hypotheses.  Finally, when possible, we try to empirically
assess  the importance  of such  effects,  something that has  not been  done so  far.  We consider  the
evidence  primarily from Chile, Peru and Argentina, since these countries have the longest experience
with this type of pension reform.  However,  even in the latter two  cases this time period is relativelv
short, so  the statistical evidence is scarce.  We also analyze  panel data  evidence using a sample of 33
emerging economies, and  a subsample of seven Latin American countries.  Some of the conclusions
we  offer  must  be  considered  preliminary  and will  need  to be  verified  again  as  a  longer period of
observation becomes available.
Overall,  the  evidence  provided  in  this paper  seems  to be  consistent  with  the  claims  bv
advocates of reform.  Pension reform  facilitates  the accumulation  of institutional  capital through an
adaptive  legal framework,  increased  specialization  in the investment  decision-making  process,  more
transparency  and  integrity  (particularly  via  the mandatory  risk-rating  process),  and  also  through  a
new corporate governance balance, particularly evident in the case of Chile.
We  analyze  the  hypothesis  that  one  of the  main  channels  through  which  pension  fund
reform  affects  economic  performance  is  through  a  reduction  in  the  effective  cost of capital  for
firms.  The  econometric  analyses,  with  both  time-series  and  panel  data  estimation  techniques,
3 See  for  example, Valdes  and  Cifuentes,  1990;  Arrau,  1994;  Fontaine,  1996;  the critique  by  Singh,  1996;
Blornmestein,  1997; Holzmann,  1997; Burtless,  1997;  Uthoff,  1997; Blommestein,  ed.  1998,  particularly  the
chapters  by himself, de Rick and Lannoo; Blake and Orzag,  1998; Camus and Sinchez, 1998.
6indicate  that dividend  yields  are  lower  (stock prices  and price-to-book  ratios  larger)  with  reform.
The evidence also favors the hypothesis  of lower security-price volatility after reform.
We provide  qualitative evidence  regarding the creation of new financial instruments.  In this
context,  the institutional  environment  plays  a  central  role.  One interesting result however,  is  that
there  does not seem to be bank "disintermediation",  although  after reform the role of banks partly
changes.  Perhaps  one of the most important  effects  could be an improvement  in the  allocation  of
invested  funds,  which  should  translate  into  better  resource  allocation.  This  may have  permanent
positive effects on growth and welfare, even if total savings  are not affected.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  II  discusses  the  main  links  between  pension
reform  and  capital  market  development.  Section  III  provides  qualitative  and  selected  time  series
evidence.  Section IV analyzes panel data, and section V concludes.
II.  PENSION REFORM AND CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT
In this  section,  we intend  to  clarify  the rationale  behind the  link  from  pension  reform  to
capital  market  development,  and  from  that to  economic  growth  and  development.  We  see  these
links  through  three  sets  of economic  phenomena  related  to  pension  fund  reform.  Naturally,  the
extent  of the effect of pension  fund reform  on  capital  market  development will  depend upon  the
specific  characteristics  of the reform.  We take as a benchmark  for a reformed pension fund system
one that allows the competitive allocation  of pension  funds in the spirit of the Chilean-style  pension
reform.4
There  are  many  channels  through which  pension  reform  may  support  the development  of
capital  markets.  Therefore,  we  first present a  summary  of the main  ideas  (hypotheses  or claims)
presented  in  the specialized  literature regarding  this process,  including  a  few new ones.  There are
many  concurrent  conditions  to  the  process  of pension  reform  that  may  reinforce  or  lirnit  the
4  The  idea  behind  this  is  that  pension  funds  could  allocate  funds  more efficiently  only  if investment  in
securities issued by the private sector is  allowed.  Alternatively, if pension reform requires  fund managers  to
hold  only  govermnent  bonds  one  may  expect  very  little  effect  of  pension  reform  on  capital  market
development.  On the other hand,  a pension fund reform Canadian  style, where funds are managed by the
state does not comply with the competitive allocation of funds requirement.
7positive  effect  on  capital  market  development.  We  thus  also  provide  a list of these.  Finally,  the
development  of  a  capital  market  under  some  conditions  may  have  consequences  on  economic
growth, capital accumulation  and other real effects  on welfare.  We also refer to them in this section.
11.1  Processes  of Capital Market Development
A.  Accumulation  of 'Institutional Capital'
Valdes  and  Cifuentes  (1990)  develop  this  concept,  which  may be  particularly  important in
emerging  markets  and also  in countries  of Civil Law tradition,  since in the latter, laws  are required
before  certain  improvements  can  be implemented.  The accumulation  of relatively large  amounts of
investable wealth by pension  funds induces  the authorities  to provide and private sector participants
to  develop  financial  instruments  in  which  pension  funds  can  invest.  Institutions  issuing  such
instruments  will  have  to  disclose the  required  information.  This  process  is  also  likely  to  improve
transparency  in  terms  of  financial  market  practices  and  fund  management.  Therefore,  the pish
provided  by  pension  fund  growth  requires  a  (dynamic)  set  of  regulations,  labeled  "Institutional
Capital"  (p.  39).  We generalize  this idea  as "the regulatory  and  institutional  environment  in which
investors,  firms and authorities  interact with  each other".  Institutional  Capital is thus a public good
that can  contribute indefinitely  in the process of "modernizing"  capital  markets.
It  can  be  argued  that  even  without  pension  reform  there  may  be  a  trend  toward
modernization  of  laws  and  institutions,  due  to  increasing  financial  market  integration  and
technological  developments.  This is  certainly true,  but if the legal authorities can identify significant
local  institutional  investors  acting  on  behalf  of  future  pensioners  as  valid  clients  there  will  be
additional support to the required reforms.  In what follows,  we analyze specific components of this
institutional capital  (also see Blommestein,  1997,  1998; Iglesias,  1998; and Vittas, 1998).
As explained,  progress  required in order to accommodate  the growing needs  of institutional
investors  to  securtize  growing  portions  of a  nation's  capital  stock.5 This  also  leads  to  taking
advantage  of foreign expertise, although in the case of Chile, for example, many of the legal changes,
including the pension reform itself, originated  at home.
6
; See Perez Mackenna  (1988).
6  Valdes  and Cifuentes,  op.at., p. 41  claim that the some of the legal  changes introduced  in the 1986  Chilean
Bank Law took place even before the same happened in developed countries.
8The  enforcement  of  better  regulations  regarding  disclosure,  accounting  and  auditing
standards  should  lead  to  greater  capital  market  transparency.  Also,  because  of  practical
considerations,  increasing  importance  of pension  funds  may imply  a  trend  toward  self-regulation,
which  in  turn  may  be  a  more  efficient  way  to  help  the  development  of a  capital  market.7 The
creation  of  risk-rating  systems  provides  an  additional  way  of providing  transparency  to  capital
markets.  In fact, when public trust is at stake, particularly  in the case of mandatory pension  systems,
it is  expected  that  some kind of certification  or independent  opinion regarding the  riskiness of the
instruments  that  can  be  used  by  pension  funds  will  be  required  by  the  authorities.  One  such
mechanism is a mandatory risk-rating requirement.
Pension  fund  managers  are  not  expected  to  control  companies  but  they  may  become
important  minority  shareholders.  If fund  managers  act  in  the interest  of future  pensioners,  they
potentially  become important representatives  of minority shareholder interests  (Vittas,  1996;  Lanoo,
1998; Blake and Orszag,  1998).  In addition, common interests  among pension fund managers  may
open  the  possibility  of  electing  independent  board  members.  Moreover,  pension  fund
representatives  are  expected  to  have  access  to  the  regulatory  authorities  and  to  influence  public
opinion.  Finally,  since pension  funds are  relatively  large investors  for whom  it is  possible  to co-
ordinate certain  actions,  they tend  to overcome  the  free-rider  problem  that  plagues  other minority
shareholders.  Thus,  a  positive  effect  on  the  corporate  governance  balance  might  be  expected.
However,  it is also possible that pension  fund managers  do not act in  the interest of their investors
but  in  those  of  the  manager's  related  businesses.  In  addition,  the  relationship  between  fund
managers  and their  clients  may itself be  subject  to  different  kinds of agency problems.  Naturally,
regulations try to limit this.  If properly guided, it would seem likely that a new corporate  governance
balance  that favored  the development of capital markets would  arise.
B.  Increased specialization  in the investment decision-making  process
In a pension reform that increases  the degree  of funding,  assets typically  grow during a long
transitional period.  Managing increasing volumes of funds justifies increasing levels of specalization
and  requires  professional  management.  This  effect  is  reinforced  if the  reform  has  a  net positive
effect  on  savings  (for  example,  when  the  transition  is  tax-financed)  and  also if agents  substitute
individual investment management  by pension  fund investment  management.  However,  there may
also  be  a transfer from banks and savings associations  to pension  fund managers.  Since in no case
7  Self-regulation is sometimes associated with the formation of cartels, however.
9do we expect banks to be  completely  substituted, a  different  kind of expertise will  be developed in
addition  to  the existing  one.  Levine  and  Zervos  (1998)  point  out that banks  and  capital markets
presumably plav different roles in terms of supporting growth and productivity.
This process  of specialization of pension  fund management  also  implies a "spillover  effect"
affecting other related agents,  such as investment-bankers,  firm managers  and regulatory authorities.
It  should  imply  the  use  of  more  recent  knowledge,  as  well  as  newer  communications  and
information  technology.  At  the  same  time,  professional  investors  have  an  interest  in  helping
authorities  to determine the appropriate  direction for improvements  in the legal framework.
C.  Financial innovation incentives
Bodie (1989)  argues that the accumulation of funds  has been an important  force shaping the
evolution  of  financial  innovation.  As  capital  markets  grow,  there  are  bigger  gains  to  financial
innovation.  However,  the industry  analyzed  in his study  consists mostly of defined-benefit  pension
plans  in  the  United  States.  This  structure  implies  particular  kinds  of incentives.  In  the  case  of
Chilean-style defined-contribution  systems,  there may be an emphasis on shorter-term  performance,
as  in  the  case  of mutual  funds.  On  the other  hand,  there  is  evidence  of herd behavior  among
managers  of defined  benefit  pension  funds.  In  any  event,  if  significant  amounts  of  funds
accumulate,  there are  natural incentives  to  creating new  financial  instruments,  including long-term
instruments,  securities  from  new sectors  of the economy,  and also to allow investments  in foreign
markets  (Iglesias,  1998).
From  a different  perspective, Prowse  (1998) argues  that in the United States pension funds
have  been  the  major  source  of finance  for  limited  partnerships  and  joint  venture  funds, which
operate  in the private  equity market,  and are a  major financing source  for start-ups and small  firms.
A  similar  argument  is  made by  Catalin,  Impavido and Musalem  (2000)  for  contractual  savings  in
general:  portfolio managers  assume  liquidity risk in exchange  of higher expected returns.  However,
this  argument  might  be  stronger  with  regard  to  life  insurance  companies  and  defined  benefit
schemes.  In the case of competitive defined-contribution  pension systems,  as in the case of mutual
funds,  portfolio  managers  face  the  incentives  to  show  "attractive"  returns  over  relatively  short
periods of time.  This may limit the desire of portfolio managers  to favor more illiquid and harder to
value investments.
10I1.2  Concurrent Conditions
Pension  reform  seldom  takes place  in isolation, and this has  two implications.  First, other
reforms that take place simultaneously confound  the possible incremental effects  of pension reform.
Second,  it is possible  that without other concurrent  conditions,  pension  reform  turns out not to be
successful  in  terms  of supporting  the  development  of a  capital  market.  Thus,  it  is  important  to
identify  concurrent  conditions,  meaning  the  list  of institutional  and  economic  reforms  that  may
facilitate  or  condition  the  positive  effect  of  pension  reform  on  capital  market  development.
However,  in  many  cases  these  concurrent  conditions  mnight  not be  truly  exogenous,  since  other
reforms  are  required  to make  pension  reform  successful  (such  as  the  last  points  in  this  section).
Here  we  take ideas  from  Fontaine  (1996),  Blommestein  (1997)  and Uthoff (1997),  in  addition  to
elaborating new ones and organizing them into a smaller number of broader categories.'
A.  Macroeconomic  stability in a market environment
Macroeconomic  instability  is  likely  to  reduce  the  positive  effects  of pension  reform  on
capital  market development.  Since  capital markets  intermediate  funds  from  different  sources, well
functioning  credit markets  and non-distorted  fundamental  prices are  required, such  as  price levels,
real exchange rates and real interest rates.  Although not necessarily  true for all economies, based on
the  Chilean  experience  with  endemic  inflation,  we  can  argue  that  the  availability  of indexation
(inflation-protection)  helps  the development of fixed income markets.9 It is also likely that pension
reform  will  direcdy  contribute  to  macroeconomic  stability,  by  alleviating  the  political  and
demographic  pressures  imposed  by  "pay-as-you-go"  systems,  since  it  usually  requires  significant
fiscal reform.  The reform requires explicit recognition of the pension system's debt levels and raises
a  discussion  of how  this  is  to  be  financed.  In  the  end, whether  or  not  pension  reform  helps
macroeconomic  stability  will  depend  on  the  strength  of  the  reform  and  the  financing  of the
transition."'  Later, we discuss the impact of pension reform on savings.
8 For an analysis of the reforms and stabilization process of the Chilean econony, see Bosworth, Dornbusch,
and Laban  (1994).
9 Diamond and Valdes  (1994)  also noted this. Walker (1998)  in addition emphasizes  the need of a consistent
legal environment.
10  However,  pension  reform  may  fail  to  reduce  the  fiscal profligacy  if,  for instance,  fund  managers  are
required to hold large blocks of government debt, avoiding hard fiscal decisions altogether.
11B.  Adequate tax incentives
A  well-known  fact  is  that  the  development  of specific  financial  instruments  importantly
depends  on  tax-incentives.  For  example,  other  things  equal,  tax  advantages  for debt will  provide
incentives  to the  development  of a  market  for corporate  debt.  Taxes may also  give advantages  to
using retained  earnings instead of issuing equity; or related-firm lending instead of issuing new debt.
Uthoff (1998) emphasizes  for the case of Chile that due to tax-incentives  earnings retention  by firms
has been one  of the important  sources of increased  savings in Chile.  Notice  that earnings retention
may  be  a  policy  favored  by  long-term  institutional  investors,  especially  under  a  shortage  of
investment  alternatives,  which  makes  these  facts  interdependent.  Also, Walker  (1998)  points  out
that  inflation-neutrality  in  the  tax  code  favors  the  development  of  an  indexed  debt  market.
Therefore,  the  kind  of  tax  regime  in  place  is  an  important  variable  to  be  controlled  for  when
assessing  the impact of pension reform on capital markets.
C.  Progressive capital control liberalization
It may be debatable whether  the incremental  impact  of pension  reform  on  capital markets
depends  or not on the extent there is  freedom in  capital  inflows and  outflows,  although it is likely
that restrictions  negatively affect the overall development of the market.  There may thus be  a joint
positive  effect.  However,  if both  reforms  tend  to  happen  simultaneously  it  may  be difficult  to
determine  the irnpact of each.
D.  Adequate regulation and competition in the financial services  industry
Overregulation  or  lack  of  competition  in  the  financial  services  industry  may  limit  the
development  possibilities of capital markets.  For example,  competition  among security traders  and
stock  exchanges  allows  for  transaction  costs  that  do  not  inhibit  trading.  Also,  prudential  bank
regulation implies  fair competition  among alternative  fund suppliers, including pension funds.
E. Property rights, bankruptcy legislation  and investor protection
In  capital  markets,  contingent-claims  on  the  value  of firms  are  traded.  If  these  claims'
boundaries  are  not  well  delimited,  security  prices  will  be  significantly  penalized,  rendering  the
issuance  of such  claims  unattractive  for  firms  seeking  funds.  It is  thus  obvious  that  a  required
condition  for a capital market to develop, with or without pension reform, is that property rights  are
well  established.  La Porta  et  al  (1996,  1997)  argue  that legal protection  to investors  has  no good
12substitutes,  especially  in  Civil  Law  countries.  This  has  additional  implications  in  the  case  of
regulated  industries.  In  any  case,  it is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  regulators  that pursue  a
successful pension reform must adapt investor protection  and bankruptcy legislation  to the needs of
the new institutional investor.  Lack of protection  may negatively affect public trust of the reform.
F.  Privatization of state-owned  companies
Privatization  of state-owned  firms  is likely to have important  effects  on the  development  of
capital markets.  Firms  that relied before on  centralized  credit  allocation may now opt for the bond
and  stock  markets.  Also,  if  the  privatization  process  purposely  considers  a  vast  dispersion  of
property,  higher  transaction  volumes  in  stocks  are  expected.  Pension  fund  participation  may
enhance  these  effects.  However, privatization  can be implemented  in many ways, such as  assigning
shares of the privatized firms directly into individual accounts, with or without authorization  to trade
them.  In addition,  it could be implemented  as  a  private  transaction  between  the  State and a single
controlling  shareholder.  In  the  later  two  cases,  no  impact  on  capital  market  development  is
expected.  Finally,  reversals  could  take  place.  After the  1998  Asian  crisis, many  of the  previously
privatized  firms  in  Latin  America  were  purchased  by  private  investors  that  bought  out minority
shareholders,  converting  them into  closely-held  companies,  and  sometimes  delisted  them from  the
exchanges.  Explanations  for this may be related with a lack of investor protection  and rent seeking
by controlling  shareholders  (Bebchuk  1999).
11.3  Consequences  of pension fund induced capital market development
Recent  empirical  evidence  has  established  links  between  indicators  of financial  market
development,  economic growth  and productivity."  In this  paper, we are interested  in the effect of
pension  reform  on  capital  market  development.  Thus,  we  only discuss  the  effects  on economic
activity that pension reform is likely  to have via  capital markets.  We do not analyze  other channels
through which pension fund reform and economic growth may be related.
From a theoretical  point of view,  the  development  of capital  markets  may  have  a  positive
effect  on  economic  growth  through  two  channels:  (a) increased  savings;  and  (b)  more  efficient
allocation of savings.
11  See Levine and Zervos  (1998),  Levine, Loayza and Beck (1998),  De Gregorio  (1998),  Rousseau  (1998) and
Arestis et al (2001).
13A.  Increased  savings
The effect of pension  fund reform on savings depends on many characteristics  of the reform
and the economy.  To name  a few:  (a) the financing of the transition  towards a new pension system;
(b)  the  extent  of crowding  out  of voluntary  savings  by  mandatory  savings;  (c)  the  strength  of
intergenerational  transfer  motives;  and  (d)  redistribution  effects  between  groups  with  different
marginal  saving  rates  and/or  borrowing  constraints. 12 In  addition,  pension  reform  is  likely  to
accelerate  the  process  of capital  market  development.  Through  this  channel,  the  reform  helps
improve  the  process  of  screening  and  monitoring  of  new  projects  and  also  helps  with  the
diversification  of systemic  risk.  This  enables individuals to participate in more investment projects,
increasing the rate of investment of the economy.
At the empirical  level,  the effect  of pension fund  reform on  savings is ambiguous.  On  the
one hand, some  studies analvzing  the Chilean  case show  a negligible  effect  on net of Social  Security
saving rates and others  a positive  effect on saving rates among higher income households because of
tax benefits  (Coronado,  1999).  From a  list of 19 econometric  studies  surveyed  by Schrnidt-Hebbel
(1998),  on  the response  of voluntary private  savings  to social  security  contributions  and benefits,  8
report lower saving rates,  3 report higher saving rates and 8 report no significant effect.  The indirect
impact  on  savings  through  capital  market  development  does  not seem  to perform  better.  Levine
and  Zervos  (1998) show that none  of the  financial indicators provided in  their study is  significantly
correlated with private savings.
B.  Cost of capital reduction for firms
Iglesias  (1998)  argues  that the  fully  funded  pension  systems  may  imply  a  reduction  in  the
cost of funds for firms, and attributes this effect to the accumulation of financial savings as opposed
to other types of wealth.  If private  savings  are not intermediated  by  financial markets they take  the
form  of private  equity,  land,  gold  and  others."3 Vittas  (1996)  argues  that pension  reform  brings
pooling of long-term  financial  savings, which can underpin capital market development.
These  arguments  are  incomplete  because  it is  necessary  to identify  the  kind  of structural
change  that  need  to  take  place  in  order  to  justify  that  the  required  rates  of return  may  indeed
decrease after  the accumulation  significant  pension  funds.  This is particularly important given that,
12  For an analysis  and empirical  evidence on  the effect of pension  fund reformn  on savings  see Coronado
(1997), Schmidt-Hebbel (1998),  Burdess (1997),  and Mackenzie,  Gerson and Cuevas  (1997).
13  See also P6rez Mackenna  (1988).
14as  we pointed  out above,  econometric  studies  show only small  increases  in savings  attributable  to
pension reform.  In other words, if pension funds  were simply to substitute other sources of private
savings,  why would  this imply  a  lower cost of capital?  We  can  think  of three possible  answers to
this:  lower direct  costs of issuing securities,  lower "term premia",  and lower  "risk premia".  These
arguments  resemble the effects that usually are attributed to capital market integration  (for example,
see Bekaert and Harvey,  1998 and the references  cited therein).'4
First,  due  to  the  overall  development  of  the  capital  market,  the  direct  costs  of issuing
securities  are likely to be lower.  This naturally implies a reduction in the cost of capital.  We analyze
this channel in more detail later in this section.
Second,  the time-horizon  of pension  funds  is expected  to be longer  than that of individuals
or firms  that buy financial  instruments.  In the case  of individuals,  even if at  aggregate  levels  total
savings are stable  over time, the  average maturity of such  savings  (duration)  is likely to be  relatively
short.  This should indeed be the case, considering  the precautionary  nature of savings.  In the case
of firms,  whose  business  is  not  financial,  they  transitorily  invest in financial  securities.  Thus,  by
definition they are short-term investments.  In contrast, and even though pension fund performance
may be  measured in  the short  term,  the  certainty  that  a large  fraction  of these  funds need not be
liquidated until the  distant future, at least  in  the aggregate,  allows  pension fund managers  to  chose
longer investment  maturity.  This means  that even  if total  savings  do not increase  after  a pension
reform,  the  average  maturity  of the  financial  securities  would  be lengthened.  In  other words,  the
required  "term premium"  (also called  "liquidity  premium")  should  be lower.';  The  next argument
reinforces  this idea.
Third, given that pension  funds manage  other people's  money and that absolute  volatility is
not  expected  to  have  a  direct  effect  on the  welfare  of managers,  it  is  likely  that  the  average  risk
tolerance  of the capital  market will increase.  This implies  a  lower equity risk premium, which also
lowers the average cost of capital  for firms.
14  In any case, studies such as  that of Fama and French (2001)  have  found that there has been a downward
trend in the equity premium.  In this context,  pension  reform  may have  an incremental impact,  either  by
accelerating  the  premium  reduction  or  by  having  an additional  independent  effect.  This is  a potentially
complex issue and we do not intend to dilucidate it in this paper.
15  Short-term  performance  evaluation  may  indeed  shorten  the  investment  horizons  of  pension  fund
managers,  but these are still expected  to be longer than individual investors'.  Applying the same  argument to
defined benefit systems it may be true  that the  reduction in  the required  premia would  be larger in such a
case.
15Thus, the  above implies that the cost of capital should  fall.  Moreover, if such cost of capital
is  evaluated  at  the  "optimal"  mix  of financing  sources  we  may  be  able  to  conclude  even  more
strongly that the "risk-adjusted  cost of capital" would  decrease.t6 Here it is important  to notice that
the  ability  to  obtain  the  "appropriate  kind"  of longer-term  funding  may  imply  reductions  in  the
residual  losses  of  issuing  securities,  because  of  more  efficient  risk-sharing  mechanisms.  For
example,  a  higher  degree  of asset-liability  duration-matching  by industrial  firms,  lowers  expected
bankruptcy costs thus reducing  financing costs.
This  may  also  have  implications  for  the  costs  associated  with  information  asymmetries.
Even  if such  asymmetries  were  to remain  the  same,  these  costs  may  be  reduced.  For  example,
Myers'  (1982)  "pecking-order"  theory establishes  that there will be a sequence of preferred financing
sources, starting with  short-term  debt,  ending with equity,  depending on the  degree of information
asymmetry,  cetens  paribus.  This  argument  takes  as  given  a  "reasonable"  equilibrium  among  the
costs  of  the  different  financing  alternatives.  The  fact  that  firms  could  now  get  better-suited
financing packages would reduce  the residual losses due to information  asymmetry, because  a lower
number of projects would be left out due to inappropriate  financing sources.
The above implies that even though pension reform  may not increase total savings, it is likely
to have a positive effect  on growth and welfare caused by a better allocation  of investment funds.  If
the overall  (risk-adjusted)  cost of capital  indeed falls, at  every point in  time there will  be a  different
(not necessarily  larger)  set of attractive investment projects.  If longer-term-higher-expected-return
projects  are now accepted  (which perhaps  also are the riskier  ones, from the perspective  of a short-
term investor) this implies higher expected economic growth.17
C.  Financial market integration
Obstfeld  (1994)  argues  that  more  integrated  capital  markets  allow  better  risk  sharing
mechanisms  tilting the market portfolio towards higher-return  investments thus increasing economic
growth.  De Gregorio  (1999)  finds evidence that financial integration increases  the depth of financial
system inducing higher economic growth.
16 It is not enough  to just look at the average  interest rate that woiud be charged to firms.
17 It may be argued that this  need not be true if there is access to external  capital markets.  Nevertheless,  as
Chile's  1982  experience  indicates,  external  financing  may  entail  significant  risks  for  projects  in  the  non-
tradable  sector of the economy. Thus, given  a lack of currency matching  fewer projects would be considered
attractive  on a risk-adjusted basis.
16An  institutional  environment  that  favors  the development  of the pension  fund industry  is
likely  to give  additional  incentives  to  the international  integration  of financial  markets.  Financial
integration  can  be  understood  as  an  "alignment"  of the risk-return  trade-off  with  the rest  of the
world's.  Increased  liquidity, transparency  and especially  a  better protection of minority shareholder
rights allow us to expect more foreign portfolio investment.
From a different perspective, since pension  funds can become  quite large with respect  to the
size  of the domestic capital  market, the possibility of allowing local funds  to invest abroad becomes
more  likely.  However,  this  process  may  be  slow.  Perhaps  because  of incentives  arising  from
competition  among  AFPs,  but  also  because  of  regulatory  restrictions,  Chile  began  investing
significant amounts abroad only after the Asian  financial crisis.
Finally,  information  requirements,  sound  market  practices  and  minority  shareholder
protection  may make  it easier  for local  firms to issue  securities  abroad (such  as  bonds and ADRs).
The three forces lead the capital markets  towards integration.
Here  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that,  independent  of pension  reform,  financial
integration  per se may also  lead to a reduction  in  the cost of capital for firms.  Thus, it is necessary
to control  for  this in  order  to verify  empirically  if indeed  the implementation  of a  pension  system
reduces the  cost of capital.  For instance,  for Chile, Walker  and Lefort (1999)  report a permanent
and significant  fall  in  the  dividend  yield  levels  in  1990, which  in turn  reflects  a  fall  in the  cost of
equity capital  that is probably due to higher integration.  This coincides  with a time-period in which
pension  funds were allowed to increase their participation in local equity.
D.  Reduction of transaction costs,  increased liquidity and lower price volatility
Several  authors  have  written  about  these  issues  (for  example,  see  Blommestein,  1997;
Iglesias,  1998;  Vittas,  1998).  From  a theoretical  point  of view,  more  liquid  (less  expensive)  stock
markets increase incentives  to invest in long-duration projects,  because investors can more easily sell
their  stake  before  the  project  matures  (Levine  and  Zervos,  1998).  Therefore,  good  investment
projects with  long duration  can be undertaken,  increasing economic  growth.  Moreover,  because of
economies  of scale,  there  may  be  a  virtuous  circle  in  the relationship  between  transaction  costs,
liquidity  and  volatility,  in  that  they  can  be presumed  to  reinforce  each  other.  In  addition,  new
institutions  may be created  to handle increased transaction volumes, such as  new electronic  security
trading  systems,  more  competition  among  alternative  markets,  centralized  custody  deposits,  and
others  alike.  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986)  present  a  less  optimistic  view.  They  argue  that  more
17liquidity  in  the  market  facilitates  security  selling,  reducing  incentives  of minority  shareholders  to
monitor  controlling shareholders.  The empirical  evidence,  however,  shows that both more liquidity
and less price volatility  are positively  correlated with current and future  economic growth."8
The  expectations  of lower  securirv  price  volatility  and higher volumes  caused  by pension
funds  can  be  justified  using  the  same  kind  of arguments  regarding  the  effects  of capital  market
integration  (for example  see  Bekaert  and Harvey,  1998):  it happens  due  to a  wider  investor  base
jointly with  access to more information  and analysis.  This implies that prices fluctuate  more closely
with  fundamental  values  and  that small  deviations  from  such  fundamentals  cause  large  volumes  of
trades.
There  is  vet another perspective  that may  allow  us to  conclude that  security  price volatility
could  decrease  because  of pension  reform  - the  time  dimension.  Indeed,  at  least  part  of the
correlation  exhibited  by  security  returns  across different  markets  and  regions  can  be  attributed  to
variation  in  required  risk  premia.  If  local  pension  funds'  risk  tolerance  is  assumed  to  remain
relatively  constant  over  time,  then  advantage  should  be  taken  of variations  in  risk  premia  (that
perhaps  are  caused  by variations  in  foreign  investors'  risk  tolerance).  This  is  done  by purchasing
securities when  the risk premia is high  (at "low"  prices)  and vice versa.  Thus, price variations  should
be less extreme when compared with a market that does not have this class of investors.  Notice that
this is consistent with Caballero's  (2001)  idea that local capital markets should  help mitigate external
shocks.
E.  Secondary  effects  on the financial system's  structure and other markets
The  development  of a  pension  system  may  imply  different  forms  of development  and
organization  of other  competing/complementary  industries.  For  example,  Blommestein  (1998);
finds  related  development  of the  life  and  disability  insurance  industry7 in OECD  countries.  Thus
government  financing,  banks, life insurance  companies,  and even  certain industries will  be affected.
For example,  it may impact the housing industry if the mortgage bond market is successful.
Since significant  long-term  resources  are accumulated,  a redefinition  of the market "niches"
for banks  and  other  fund  providers  is  likely  to  take  place.  Banks  will  probably  concentrate  on
shorter-term financing and/or on individuals  and smaller firms.
18  See Levine and Zervos (1998).It is important  to consider that, at the capital market level, funds are "melted together" and it
becomes  impossible  to  relate  specific  sources  of funds  with  specific  uses.  It would  therefore  be
inappropriate  to  judge  the  impact  that  pension  funds  have  on  aggregate  investment  without
considering  these  indirect  effects.  For  instance,  it  may  be  true  that  a  significant  fraction  of the
pension funds is invested in government securities,  but this frees funds from other potential sources,
such as banks.  That is why it may be incorrect to assert that a particular kind of financial  investment
by pension  funds is "not productive"  as suggested by Uthoff (1997).
III.  QUALITATIVE  AND  TIME SERIES EVIDENCE
This  section  is  organized  as  follows:  We  first  analyze  qualitative  and  time series  evidence
regarding  the  effect  of pension  fund  reform  on  capital  market  development  for  three  reformer
countries, Argentina,  Chile  and Peru, and assess  whether  it supports  or contradicts  the hypotheses
presented  in the previous  section.  We  look both  at the  effect  of pension  fund  reform  on capital
market development  and at the consequences  of this development  in terms of lower  cost of capital
and  financial  integration.  We  also  consider  other  explanations  (from  the  list  of  concurrent
conditions)  to test the robustness of this evidence.
We use several  data  sources.  First, the most  specific data regarding  pension  fund portfolio
composition  is obtained from the pension fund supervisory  entity of each country.  Specifically,  for
Chile,  Peru  and Argentina,  we  obtain  data on portfolio  composition  and the number of bond and
stock issuers present  in the pension fund portfolios from the local supervisory  agencies, and Ramos
(1999)  for Peru.  For these three countries,  we also consider several  stock market indicators  that are
compared  to  the  Latin  American  average.  These  numbers  come  from  the  IFC  databases  and
comprise  dividend yields,  price-to-book  ratios, traded  volumes, stock  market returns,  and volatility
measures.  Other data sources  are local stock exchanges  and central banks.  Finally, country data on
macroeconomic  and other  capital  market  indicators is  obtained  from  Beck, Demirguc  and Levine
(1999).  We  also  measure  the  importance  of pension  fund  investments  in  the  corporate  sector
(stocks  and  bonds)  relative  to  total  market  capitalization.  Regarding  transaction  costs  we  use
19information  from Iglesias  (1998)  and De la Cuadra  and Galetovic  (1998)  in the  case of Chile,  and
from The Emerging Markets  Factbook (1998)  for a list of 45  different countries.
III.1  Institutional capital and increased  specialization  in asset management
The  anecdotal  evidence  presented  in  Table  1  heuristically  supports  the  idea  of  an
environment  that favors modernization and reform, and  the notion of an adaptive legal  framework.
It is important  to highlight the  formal and informal participation  by pension funds in the  legislative
process, which  probably  becomes  more important the  larger pension  funds  are relative to the  local
economy.  This ensures  that resulting laws  effectively resolve  the problems  faced  by these investors.
For example,  allowing Chilean pension  funds to hedge using currency  forwards  helps  explain why as
of December  1998  a  significant  5.6  percent  of  the  total  funds  managed  were  already  invested
abroad.
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Competitive  pension  fund  management  in  a  global  environment  provides  incentives  for
specialization  in  the  fund  management  business.  Moreover,  with  the  internationalization  of local
pension  funds,  technology  is  transferred  from  foreign  to  local  fund  managers.  This means  using
"modem"  information  services  and technology,  a learning  process  to understand  and invest in new
instruments,  and  a permanent  transfer of technology from the  more  advanced countries.  Frequent
contact with authorities and security issuers requires increased professionalism on their part as well.
The  role of pension  funds regarding corporate  governance  is also illustrated  in Table  1, and
the  evidence  seems to be supportive  of an improved balance among market participants.  The main
channels  are  the  participation  of independent  board members representing  pension  funds,  and  the
changes  in corporate  legislation.  Iglesias  (2000)  argues  that partly  because  of pension  reform,  in
Chile  the  number of independent  boards  members  increased,  monitoring  costs  fell  as  a  result  of
improved information  quality,  companies where pension funds have invested are under  close public
scrutiny,  shareholder meetings become more relevant, and bondholder protection  also improves.
The  evidence presented  is also consistent with the claim that both transparency  and integrity
improve  with  reform.  Risk rating procedures  at  the very least promote  information  exchange  and
coordination  among  issuers,  authorities  and  pension  funds,  which  is  expected  to  improve
transparency.  In  addition,  transactions  have  to  take  place  in  organized  secondary  markets  and
securities have to be valued at market prices, which provides incentives to monitor security prices.
20Finally,  the clear identification  and penalization  of inadequate resolution  of the conflicts  of
interest  faced by pension fund managers  helps identify  similar situations in the case of other market
participants.  Bad market practices become  more clearly recognized in terms of their negative  effects
on third parties, in this  case on future pensioners.  Thus,  they may face more severe  social  sanction,
be it fornal or informal.
In  any  case,  for  the  three  countries  analyzed,  other reforms  took  place  at  the same  time,
including macroeconomic  stabilization  plans.  Naturally, these  complementary  reforms underpin  the
modernization process that is reflected in the accumulation  of institutional capital.20
III.2  Cost of capital reduction for firms
In general,  it is  difficult  to  estimate  the  inpact that  the  competitive  allocation  of pension
funds  towards  private  securities  has  had  on  the  cost of capital.  A  thorough  analysis  is  needed,
because  many  other  variables  may  have  evolved  favorably  or unfavorably  during  the same  time
period.  But the analysis presented below provides  a reference point.
A.  The qualitative evidence
An indirect way to look at the effect that pension  funds may have on firms' cost of capital is
to consider their importance  within the existing stock of securities.  If pension  funds  buy a "large"
fraction  of a  growing  stock of securities,  it probably  reflects  a "convenient  required  rate of return"
from  the perspective  of issuers;  otherwise  they would  not issue such  securities.  Furthermore,  the
lack  of investment  alternatives  frequently  noted  by  pension  fund  managers  might  even  reflect
disequilibrium  rates of return,  which would be "too low"  for periods  of time in which insufficient
investment alternatives  are available.
19 Of course,  liberal investment  regulations  and poor  local  market performance  also explain  why  Chilean
pension fund managers started to look abroad.
20  The hypothesis that adequate  concurrent conditions  are necessary  for  a successful pension fund  reform is
being tested  during the Argentinean  crises  of 2001-02.  In response  to the fiscal distress  and the need  to
service the external debt, the Argentinean  government has implemented several measures that may reduce the
public confidence  on the  private  pension system.  First,  by mid  2001,  the minister of economy, Domingo
CavaDo,  announced  a  reduction  of  the  actual  1  1% mandatory  contribution  to  pension  fund  individual
accounts, to a  5% during a year.  Second,  by the end of 2001,  about 17 bilion dolars  of Argentinean dolar
denominated Treasury Bonds in pension  fund portfolios were swapped against a credit to the government at
a maximum rate of 7%.  This  credit was lately denominated in pesos ate the official  1.4 $/US$ rate.  Finally,
The government forced the AFJPs  to invest all their liquidity in 4-months treasury bills.  This measure seek to
finance the  government  deficit in order to meet the  IMF fiscal requirements.  This change in  policy is  in
violation of establshed  investment limits on govenmment securities.
21Table 2 shows that in December of 2000 Chilean pension funds held about 40 percent of the
total amount  outstanding of corporate  bonds.  This number has ranged between  40 and 62 percent
since 1988.  Also in December of 2000 they held 7 percent of the total equity market cap (within the
range 4-11  percent).  These percentages  further increase if insurance companies are also considered.
For Argentina, Table 2  shows  that in  1997 pension funds held important percentages  of the
total amount outstanding  of each kind of security.  This illustrates  the significance  of pension funds,
despite  their  short  history.  Also  (ASAP,  1998,  p.  160)  the  percentage  of  total  assets  held  by
institutional  investors  has increased  from  2.5%  to 20%.  Finally,  during the  1995 crisis, institutional
investors'  funds  almost  completely  replaced  the  reduction  in  holdings  by  foreigners.  This  is
indicative of the stabilizing role of institutional investors.
In Peru, the  fraction  held by pension  funds  of the outstanding  bond issues  has  been in the
range  of 41-45  percent  since  1996  (Table  2).  Also, pension  funds held  near 7  percent of the  total
equity market cap by  2000.  All this has happened in the context of growing markets.  The corporate
bonds  outstanding  increased  from  85  million  US  dollars  in  1994,  to  nearly  1.2  billion  in  2000.
Ramos  (1999) argues that investment  limits have distorted interest rates, since pension  funds cannot
invest abroad and must  take as given the conditions offered  by local issuers.
In  addition,  Table  2 also indicates  an  important growth in  the sizes  of the corporate  bond
markets  toward  the  year  2000,  which  suggests  an  interesting  "substitution  effect".  In  times  of
depressed  stock  prices  firms  may  find  it convenient  to  change  their  source  of financing  to  debt.
This added flexibility  will  exist  only if there are important local providers of funds  denominated  in
local  currency.  The flexibility  in the financing sources  may imply lower financing  costs, on average.
Here we do not discuss the rationality  of such actions (e.g.,  market timing) by firms.
Table  3 shows the number  of issuers present in pension  fund portfolios.  Upward trends in
these numbers  for all  three countries  indicate that these issuers  have found a "convenient"  source of
financing  in pension  funds.  Table  4  shows  the "importance"  of pension  fund investments  in the
corporate sector  (stocks and bonds) relative  to total market capitalization.  This weight indicates  the
importance  that pension  funds might  have  on the  cost of capital  for traded  firms.  In  Chile,  this
"weight"  became  near  5 percent  in  1986,  whereas  in Argentina  and  Peru  this  happened  in  1996.
Nevertheless,  for  the  latter countries  the importance  of pension  funds  has grown  at a  faster  pace.
By 2000,  the  "relative  importance"  of pension  funds was  larger  for Argentina  and  Peru  than  the
maximum ever observed in Chile.
22Any  effect on the cost of capital  should be  reflected on the historical evolution  of price-to-
book  ratios,  dividend  yields  and  price-earnings  ratios.  Book  values,  dividends  and  earnings  are
different ways of scaling the equity price level.  These indicators  reflect the cost of equity  capital for
firms  and  also  reflect  growth  expectations.  Fama  and  French  (2001)  notice  that  the  long  term
expected  return  of investing  in  equity  is  the  dividend  yield  plus  the  long-term  rate  of growth  in
earnings,  book values  or dividends.  The reason  for  this is  that the price  level,  aggregate  earnings,
dividends  and  book  values  are  co-integrated.  Given  that variations  in  expected growth  rates  are
seldom  permanent and  that its  volatility is  small  compared  with  that of security  prices,  the  largest
fraction  of the (permanent)  level changes  in price-to-book  ratios,  dividend yields  and price-earnings
ratios presumably  correspond to variations in required rates of return.2'
Table 5  shows several  stock market indicators  for Argentina,  Chile and Peru compared with
the Latin American  average.  The numbers  have been calculated  based  on IFC databases.  The year
in  which  these  countries'  pension  systems  started  investing  in  equity  is  highlighted.  Figure  1
presents  similar  evidence  on  a  monthly  basis.  The  vertical  lines  indicate  the dates when  pension
fund investment  in stocks  became larger  than one million  US dollars in Chile,  Peru and Argentina,
respectively.
The evidence presented  does not show clear qualitative  evidence in  favor of our hypothesis.
In the cases of Argentina and Perl,  it is not clear that the relative price-to-book ratios increased at all
with  the  accumulation  ("weight')  of  pension  assets.  Our  calculations  for  Chile  (based  on
information  from  the  Santiago  Stock  Exchange)  indicate  that  the  weighted-average  price-to-book
ratio was 0.31 in 1985.  In 1987, when nine large recently privatized  firms had received pension fund
investment,  this  number  increased  to  0.71.  In  1990,  after  investment  limits  and  property
concentration requirements  were relaxed, it further increased to 1.0.  The peak was achieved at 2.5  in
1994  and later, in  1998,  after the Asian  crisis,  fell to  1.11.  Relatively  similar  patterns  appear in  the
dividend yields."  However, the price-to-book  ratios measured  relative to a Latin American index  are
1.3  and  2.2  for  1986  and  1987  respectively,  and  1.1  and  1.6  for  1989  and  1990,  respectively.
21 In any case, we need to keep in mind that the absolute values that these numbers take may reflect different
accounting  standards  and regulations  as welL  For  example,  certain  expenses  could  be deferred  in given
countries but not in others, thus affecting the price-to-book  ratios.  Also, Chilean firms are required by law to
pay 30 percent  of profits  as dividends,  and thus  other things  equal  dividend yields  may be higher than  for
other countries.
22 The exception is  1986.  This happens because that year massive privatization took place.  The market value
of those firms is  included in the denominator of the dividend yield whereas  the  dividends  that would have
corresponded are not fully included in the numerator.
23Therefore, we indeed  find a noticeable increase  in the  ratio's value  in 1987 and  then again  in 1990
but these  figures  exhibit  too much  variability, not allowing  us  to detect permanent  changes.  In the
cases of Argentina and Per6, no clear patterns appear either.
The next section performs  time-series regression analyses on these variables.
B.  Time-series  evidence
As  argued,  indicators  that  are  correlated  with  the  cost  of equity  capital  for  firms  are  the
historical  price-to-book  ratios  and dividend yields.  Figure  1 shows the  monthly evolution  of (log)
price-to-book  ratios  and  dividend  yields  for Argentina,  Chile,  Peru and  a  Latin  American  average.
There is  a clear positive correlation  among  countries for these variables  through  time,  although  the
figures  for  Argentina  show  extreme variability.  Except  for Argentina,  (which  has  a correlation  of
+0.08) the general patterns for dividend yields are  consistent  with those of the price-to-book  ratios,
with  monthly  correlation  of -0.81,  -0.86,  -0.63  for  Chile,  Peru  and  the  Latin  American  index,
respectively.
Our  general  hypothesis  is  that  pension  asset  accumulation  causes  the  cost  of capital  to
decrease.  This  should  be reflected  in higher  price-to-book  ratios  (or lower  dividend  yields)  ceteris
pan bus.  A  related  hypothesis  is  that the sensitivity  to changes  in the  Latin American  required  risk
premium  should  also  decrease  with  pension  reform.  To  test  these,  given  the  apparent  relative
stability, only results  for price-to-book ratios are presented.  The estimated equations using monthly
data are the following:
d log(PB,,) = a, + a, d log(PBLA) + a,d(LPFInv, ) + a3[d log(PB,LA@ ) x d(LPFInv  )] + E
(1)
where PBj, is the price-to-book  ratio of country l's IFC index  and the superscript L-A  stands
for Latin America;  LPFI,, represents  the log of the pension  fund investment  in stocks in country  i
and period t if such investment is greater than US$1  million, and zero otherwise.
The equation  is formulated  in  first differences  because  the levels of the  (log)  price-to-book
ratios  tend  to  show  (empirically)  unit roots,  despite  the  strong  intuitive reasons  for  stationarity.23
Thus,  we  end up estimating  a  "market model"  formulated in terms  of differences  between  the rate
23 We use the term "stationary"  as indicating the absence of a unit root,  not as  meaning that the probability
distribution  does  not change  over  time.  Price-to-book  ratios  (as  well  as  other  ratios)  are  expected  to be
24of growth of the country's  stock price index and its book value against the  same variable  calculated
for the Latin American  index.  The  hypotheses  are a2 >0, since price-to-book  ratios  should increase
with  pension  fund  investment  because  of lower  required  rates  of return,  and  a,<0, since  price
variations  should  become  less  sensitive  to  the  changes  in  the  Latin American  risk premium  when
pension fund investment in stocks is significant.
Results  are  presented  in  Table  6.  Only  for  Chile do  they  indicate  that  there is  a  strong
positive  relationship between  variations  in price-to-book  ratios and pension  fund investment, a2,  as
expected.  For  the  other  countries  the  coefficient  is  insignificant.  This  lack  of significance  for
Argentina  and Peru  may also  be  due to the short  history of their pension  systems.  Regarding  the
lower sensitivity to changes  in the Latin American  index  (a3 ) the  coefficient  is indeed negative  for
the three  countries, and significant  for Chile and Argentina  (at least in a one  tail 5 percent test).
We also induded variables  related with the Asian crisis,  since most of the pension fund data
for Argentina  and Peru coincides with it.  The variable  corresponds  to a dummy that takes the value
of 1 after August 1997.  It is not significant.  However, we do find that for Chile the response  to the
Latin  American  index  increased  during  the  crisis.  It  is  not  yet  possible  to  assert  whether  this
represents  a  structural  change.  In  any  case,  including  these  variables  does  not  change  our
conclusions.
Regarding  the robustness  of our tests, the  sensitivity  to  the Latin American  index is  always
strongly present in all countries.  For Argentina, given the extreme initial variability,  results regarding
the  decreased  sensitivity  disappear  if we  extend  the  sample  backwards.  On  the  other hand,  the
recursive  coefficients  are  relatively  stable  in  terms  of their  value,  and  pension  fund investment
always  tends to reduce sensitivity  to the Latin  American index.  However,  significance  appears only
towards  the end, which is partly due to the small number of observations with positive investment in
stocks by the Argentinean  pension system.  For the variables of interest,  results  for Peru are never
significant.  For Chile, and  despite  possible  structural  changes  detected by  CUSUM  tests, recursive
coefficients  always  show a reduced  sensitivity associated  with pension  fund investment  and also  an
increase  in price  to book  ratios,  which becomes  significant  from  1992  on  (at  5  percent,  one tail).
Surprisingly,  pooled  estimation procedures  that  force  coefficients  a2 and  a3 to  be  the same  for all
three  countries  indicate  that  both  are  significant  and  have  the  expected  signs,  which  reflects
stationary  since  the  aggregate  book values  and the aggregate  stock price  level can not  diverge indefinitely
from each other.
25interesting  gains in the statistical  power of such results.  Finally, when  changing the proxy of the cost
of capital to the dividend yield, the only country that shows the same results is Chile.  For Argentina
and Peru, this can be at least partly attributed  to noise in the data.
Summarizing,  we do find evidence  that pension fund investment in  stocks is associated with
reduced responsiveness  to external shocks  in all  countries  and also that price-to book-ratios  tend to
be positively associated with it.  Altogether, the evidence is consistent with our hypotheses  regarding
a reduction in  the cost of capital for firms with pension asset  accumulation.  However, these results
are strongly influenced by Chile.
C.  Event-study evidence
Maturana  and Walker  (2001)  use an event-study  methodology to estimate abnormal returns
during a  32-day window period surrounding  the date at which specific  stocks became  eligible  for the
first time by AFPs.  The average  abnormal return is  5.7 percent  during the entire sample period  and
8.5  percent  during  the  1986-1992  sample period.  This  is  equivalent  to  a  significant  drop  in  the
equity cost of capital  for these  firms.  This  study so far has been completed  only for Chile,  and will
be extended to include Peru and Argentina.  Preliminary estimations give similar results  for Peru.
111.3  Reduction of transaction costs, increased liquidity and lower security-price volatility
A.  Qualitative evidence
In  this  area,  most  of  the  available  qualitative  evidence  is  for  Chile.  Regarding  traded
volumes, one year  following the creation of pension funds, the amounts traded  in fixed income were
multiplied  10-fold.  Traded  volumes had been multiplied by 10 again  as of 1987.  The  1987 volume
was  multiplied  10  times  once more  as of 1998.  In  1986,  one year  after allowing  pension  funds  to
invest in  stocks,  the amounts  traded were multiplied 5.6  times  and by  1990, more than  10 times  the
1985 level.
In the  case  of Argentina,  despite  the  short  history of the new system,  there  are  noticeable
effects.  With respect to 1993 (the year before the beginning of the new pension  system), total traded
volumes increased  more than  threefold.  Also, the average  sizes  of the trades  significantly  increased
(AFAP, 1998).
Regarding technical innovation that may reduce  transaction  costs, in 1987  the Santiago stock
exchange implemented electronic  security trading systems  (see Iglesias,  1998).  It is claimed that  this
26modernization  greatly increased  traded volumes and also the efficiency  of the market.  In November
1989, the Electronic  Stock Exchange  began operating in direct competition  with the Santiago  Stock
Exchange  (Bolsa de Comercio  de  Santiago, BCS).  It was originated mainly by agents  that wanted  to
operate with the AFPs, but that were not allowed to because pension funds were required  to operate
only in formal markets  (e.g. the BCS)  (De la Cuadra and Galetovic,  1997).  AFPs were  thus decisive,
not only in the formulation of the project, but also in  terms of redirecting part of their transactions
to  this  market.  It is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  transaction  costs  are  paid  directly  by  the
managers  and  are  not  subtracted  from  the  pension  funds.  This  naturally  creates  additional
incentives  to  reducing  transaction  costs.  Iglesias  (1998)  reports  that  BCS's  fees  charged  for  the
transaction of shares  and fixed-income  dropped  from 0.5 and  0.015 percent in  1985 to 0.12 and 0.0
percent  in  1994.  De  la  Cuadra  and  Galetovic  report  that  broker's  fees  have  also  fallen  from  1.2
percent in the early 90's to an average 0.6 percent  in 1998.  Here,  the concurrent condition that helps
explain the drop in transaction  costs is increasing  competition  among intermediaries,  especially and
in  addition  to  the  Electronic  Stock  Exchange,  new  competition  from  foreign  stock  exchanges,
particularly the NYSE.  Finally,  electronic custody  of securities  was implemented  in  1995.  Before,
by law, most of the custody took place in the Central  Bank of Chile, and transactions  meant physical
exchanges of securities.  The large pension fund holdings  importantly  justified this new institution,
which is supposed to have significant effects on transaction  costs.
For Argentina,  Decree  627 of 1996  created  the institution  of the  "market  makers",  mostly
motivated by the growth in pension fund assets  (ASAFP,  1998).
Table  7 shows evidence  of transaction  costs  for a  sample  of countries, including Argentina,
Chile  and  Peri.  Considering  only  the  direct  costs  of trading,  Chile  appears  ranked  10  in  this
universe, Argentina  26 and Peru 32.  The relative position of Chile is at least partly explained  by the
influence  that pension  funds have had on the development  of the relevant institutions.  However, if
"Market Impact"  is  also considered  as part of the  total  transaction  cost, Chile's rank  almost equals
that of Argentina, suggesting  that despite the large volumes managed by local pension funds liquidity
still is relatively low.24
Altogether,  the  evidence  suggests  that  the  impact  of pension  funds  on  traded volumes  is
largest at the beginning.  However, their effect on institutions  that help  reduce transaction costs may
be more permanent.  Next, we analyze time-series  evidence  for Argentina,  Chile and Per6 where we
27study the effect that pension fund asset accumulation  has on traded volumes  in stocks  and on stock
return volatility.
B.  Time-series  evidence
The  hypotheses  to be  tested  here  are  that  the accumulation  of pension  fund  assets  causes
security  price volatility  and direct  transaction costs  to decrease,  and traded volumes  to increase.  We
do  not have  time-series  evidence of direct  transaction  costs;  however  we can look at volatility  and
traded volumes.  Again,  the data source is the IFC Database.  The empirical approach  adopted here
is to find a "good"  empirical model, conditioning on a  set of information variables, and test whether
assets  accumulated by pension  funds have incremental explanatory  power.  The dependent variables
are presented in Figure 2.
Regarding  volatility,  we  already  showed  indirect  evidence  in  the  previous  section  that
pension  fund  investment  is  associated  with  a  reduced  sensitivity  of the  local  returns  to  a  Latin
American index, which means a reduction in systematic volatility.  The question now is the effect on
total volatility.  Two methodologies have been used.  The first one explicitly uses estimated volatility
levels  as dependent  and explanatory variables.  The second methodology  uses ARCH equations  and
determines  whether  pension  fund  investment  appears  with  a  negative  coefficient  in  the variance
equation.
The  first  methodology  uses  least  squares  for the  estimated  log-volatilities.  The estimated
equations  are:
log(di,)  =d  + d1 log(&,ALL ) + d2LPFInv,, + v,  (2)
Here  &,,  represents  the estimated 24 month annualized  rolling volatility;  0, AL  represents  the
average  volatility  of all included  countries  in  the  IFC  database;  as  before,  LPFInt' represents  the
investment in stocks by pension funds.  We use logs because  volatilities  must be non-negative.  We
expect  d,  to  be  positive  (volatlity  is  contagious)  and  d?  to  be  negative  (pension  fund  investment
reduces volatility).
It is important to notice that, because the dependent variable is constructed as the annualized
rolling volatility,  the error in equation  (2) will  follow an ARMA  process.  Furthermore,  even though
we  expect  volatilities  not  to  have  unit  roots,  we  cannot  reject  this  hypothesis  for  any  of the
24  One possible  reason  for this  is  the  one-year  minimum  residence  requirement  for foreign  capital  flows,
28countries.  Results  are  shown in Panel  A of Table  8.  Panel  A.1  shows  the unit root tests  for log-
volatilities in Argentina,  Chile, Perui  and the  all country average.
Panel  A.3  repeats  the  test  for  the  error  vi, of equation  (2).  We  obtain  evidence  that  the
probably  spurious unit root is removed  from the  error, which  suggests that measured log-volatilities
would  be  co-integrated  with  the  world's  average  (C(1,1)).  The  regression  equation  results  are
presented in Panel  A.2. AR(1)  and MA(1)  terms have  been included.  The sensitivity to  the world's
average  is  positive  and  significant,  appearing  largest  for  Argentina  and smallest  for  Chile.  In  all
cases,  the  pension  fund  investment  variable  has  a  negative  sign,  as  expected.  However,  even
considering  that  the coefficient  is larger  for Argentina,  it is  significant  only for the  case  of Chile.
Having  only  a few  observations with  actual investment  in  stocks by  pension  funds  (lack of power)
may explain  this.
The  above  tests  have at least one potential  problem:  they  assume that the expected  returns
(for  the  purpose  of estimating  the  volatility)  vary  slowly,  given  the  24  month  moving  average
calculation.  A  procedure  that captures  more  promptly  changes  in means  may  be more  desirable.
One such procedure is ARCH  estimation. In this case, the estimated equations  are the following:
r,,  =bo +bl, 1l+b 2ri  +b3yi, 12+e 1,
2  2 
E£a  = C 0 +C1Ei1  +c 2LPFInvi,  +u  Ui
(3)
Here r,, represents the log return for country i's index in period t,  r,LA  represents  the return  of
the Latin American  IFC  index;y, 1 , 1 2 represents  the dividend  yield that existed  twelve months before;
and LPFInvi,, corresponds  to the pension fund investment variable previously  defined.  The purpose
of  the  first  equation  is  to  capture  short-term  and  long-term  variations  in  expected  returns,  by
including  the lagged  own  return  and the dividend  yield,  respectively,  in  the context  of the Market
Model.  For  the  variance,  we  use  a  standard  ARCH  equation,  and  include  the  pension  fund
investment variable.  The hypothesis here is that c2<  0.
Results are  shown in Panel B  of Table 8.  The  estimation for the mean  shows some degree
of success  in explaining returns, especially  for Chile and Periu.  The lagged own return (b,) is always
which stresses the irnportance  of the concufrent conditions.
29significant  but curiously,  it  is negative  for Argentina.  The  coefficient  b 3 has the expected  sign  for
Chile and Argentina,  but is significant  only in the former case.
Turning  to  the  variance  equation  (Panel  B.2)  we  find  that  for  all  three  countries  C7 is
significantly  negative,  as expected  (at least at  the 5%  level, one tail,  in the case of Chile,  and much
more  significant  in the other  two  cases).  As  a robustness  check, if the  current  or lagged  squared
return  on the Latin American  index is also included  in the variance  equation, results  do not change.
In other checks,  shortening the sample greatly  increases  the significance  of the result for Argentina.
For  Chile,  significance  is  "u-shaped",  meaning  that in the  mid-period  (around  1992)  pension  fund
investment in stocks  was not significantly related with volatility.  From 1993  onwards, the coefficient
becomes  more significant.  Thus, altogether  the data  gives  support  to the hypothesis  that pension-
fund asset accumulation  reduces security price volatility.
With  regard  to  volume  traded,  the testing  methodology  adopted  is  similar.  We  adopt  an
empirical  model  and  look  for  additional  explanatory  power  by  pension  fund  investment.  The
empirical  model  used  assumes  the  following  empirical  facts:  traded  volumes  should  have positive
trends  in  growing  economies  and  in  economies  that  become  integrated  to  international  capital
markets;  they are  correlated  around the world, especially  among emerging  markets;  traded volumes
tend to be high when returns are high.  Thus the simple empirical  model:
log(V)  = eO  + e,t + e 2 log(V,"
T ) + e 3 r, 
2"  + e4LPFInv* +77,,  ({.
VZ  represents  the monthly  traded volume  for country i in period  ,  t is the time trend;  TKL4T
is  the  total volume  traded  in  Latin  American  countries,  measured  in US  Dollars;  and  r,'-  is  the
twelve  month log return  until l.  We hypothesize  e,,  e, and e, to be positive and,  more importantlv,
that e, is also positive.  Results are presented in Table 9.
We first test for stationarity.  We expect traded volumes  to be subject  to permanent random
shocks  (to have unit roots).  They do show evidence  of unit roots  even at  10%  critical levels.2'  We
also present  the  unit root  tests for the error of equation  (4) in point 3 of the table.  At least at the
5%  level, we  can reject  the unit root hypothesis  for the errors.  Altogether, this suggests that traded
volumes are co-integrated.  In general, we do find the expected  signs  for the empirical  formulation.
Trends  are  positive  and  there  is  a  positive  relation  with  aggregate  traded  volumes.  The  twelve-
month total return has the expected signs for Chile and Argentina.  More importantly, pension fund
25 These tests assume  linear trend and intercept
30investment  tends to  be significantly  and positively  related with  traded volumes  only in  Chile.  As a
robustness  check  (not  presented),  if  we  cut  the  sample  in  two  for  Chile,  we  find  significant
coefficient  for  e;, with values of 0.33 and  1.12, pre and post-1990, respectively.  This may reflect  the
increasing  size  of the  accumulated  assets  by  the  Chilean  pension  funds  and  may  also  indicate  a
structural  break.  Finally,  if  we  perform  pooled  fixed-effects  estimation  forcing  a  common
coefficient  e4, it turns out to be very  significant.  This again  may be suggesting  a  lack of power  for
individual regressions.
Thus,  we  are  able  to  find  some  empirical  support  for  the  assertion  that  pension  funds
increase  traded volumes, but again, it importantly depends on Chile.
III.4  Financial market integration
We  can  consider  different  phases  in  the  process  toward  complete  integration.  First,  the
entry of capital flows to a country.  Second  the access to foreign  capital in its diverse  forms by local
firms; and third, the investment  abroad by local investors.
Considering  the  first  phase,  Walker  and  Lefort  (1999)  report  for  Chile  a  statistically
significant  endogenous  structural  break  (permanent  drop)  in  the  dividend yield  level during  1990-
1991.  It is apparent in Figure  1.  A similar pattem is observed for the  Latin American  average.  For
Chile,  this is interpreted  as a near 6-point drop in the required rate of return on equity.26 At least for
Chile,  this may be  attributed to the debt repurchase  programs  and the macroeconomic  reforms  that
stabilized  the country.  The  fact  that similar patterns  appear for Argentina  and the Latin American
average suggests that pension reform had little to do with this, at least directly.  However,  according
to Larrain  (1990)  foreign investment  funds looked  for transparency,  good  deals and low execution
costs (liquidity).  The existence of pension funds facilitated  the first and last requirements.
Turning  to the second  phase, Saens  (1999)  reports  the sequence  of Chilean  firms  that have
issued ADRs.  This  process started in March  1990 with CTC, and has not stopped since.  In  1998,
25  ADRs  were  traded  abroad.  Most  of the  issues  occurred  in  the years  1993  and  1994,  taking
advantage  of the  relatively  "high"  valuations  (see  Table  5).  But at the  same  time, pension  funds'
legal investment  limnits  were binding,  and local  firms did not have  access to  this source of funding.
A natural way out was issuing ADRs.  The Central  Bank of Chile imposed risk-rating requirements
26 Bekaert and Harvey  (1998) choose January  1992 as the official liberalization date for Chile and November
1989 for Argentina. The proxies  for the cost of capital do not seem to reveal any particular patterns at those
dates. The integration dates are probably earlier.
31to allow  firms to issue these  securities.  Thus,  the same institutional  capital created  for the pension
funds was used  again.  Later,  some of the restrictions were lifted.  It is likely that the relatively high
valuations  achieved  by  the  companies  before  issuing  ADRs,  which  remained  high  even  though
pension  funds could not invest any more, were in part due to the pension funds'  continued presence
as  investors  (they did  not  sell).  This  may have  justified  the additional  premium paid in  the  ADR
markets.  The  fact that  more  Chilean  firms  had issued ADRs  (even more  so  than  Brazil)  perhaps
suggested  a more  "mature"  capital  market at the  time.  Probably,  this was  caused  to an  important
extent by pension reform.
In  the  case of Argentina,  the introduction  of ADRs  happened  in August  of 1991.  As  of
October  1999, ten firms  had issued ADRs.  Per6 had three.
We  cannot  assess  whether  pension  reform  has been  useful  for the purpose  of integration,
especially  in  the  cases  of Argentina  and Peru,  given  their  short  histories.  However,  integration  of
financial markets  also  happens when local investors invest abroad.  Foreign  investors may  interpret
the investment  abroad  by  local  institutions  as  an  implicit  guarantee  against  expropriation.  As  of
December  2000, Chilean pension  funds  had invested  11  percent abroad.  In the  case of Perui,  near
7.2  percent had been invested  in  Peruvian Brady  bonds.27 Argentinean  pension funds  had invested
only 4.5  percent  abroad  as  of 2000.  In  any  case, significant  cross-investments  (in and out  of the
country)  suggest that  the  expected  rates  of return  on  the different  securities  will  be closer  to  their
international  "equilibrium"  levels, which reflects  financial integration.
111.5  Creation of new  financial instruments
Table  10  presents the  evolution of the portfolio  composition  for Chile,  Argentina and Peru.
It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  evolution  of the  different  kinds  of  investments  for  the  three
countries,  since they  may reflect the evolution of the different markets.  First, in its beginnings,  the
Argentinean  system  invested  relatively  more  in  government  securities.2a  Until  their  third  year,
investments  in  that assets  dass  by  Chilean and Peruvian  pension  funds  followed  a similar  pattem.
However,  in  1996  the  figure  dropped  to  zero  in  Pern.2 9 The relative  importance  of banks  was
similar  for Perui  and  Chile,  smaller  for Argentina.  However,  the  relative importance  of mortgage
27 This reminds us of the Chapter XVIII and XIX mechanisms  of debt repurchase  implemented in Chile in
the late eighties.
28 A part of this investment may be explained by the  fact that the state-owned pension  fund has to invest  at
least 20 percent of the funds in bonds and "cedulas hipotecarias"  issued by the regional economies.
32bonds  was  much  larger  for the  Chilean  funds,  which  are relatively  safer  assets.  This  is  probably
related  with  the  existence  of inflation  protection  mechanisms  and  the  organization  of long-term
fixed-income  markets  around it.3"  Another interesting pattern  that appears with the  comparison  is
that much sooner after the reform investment in corporations by Argentinean  and Peruvian pension
funds  became  important.  This can  be explained  by two unrelated  causes:  first, the debt crisis  that
affected  Chile  in  the  early  eighties  that  meant  that  nearly  no  firms  issued  securities.  Second,
Peruvian  and  Argentinean  pension  funds  were  allowed  to  invest  in  equity  almost  from  the
beginning.  This  authorization  is  related  with  the previous  success  of that asset class  for  Chilean
pension funds.
A.  Chile
The evidence  for Chile shows  several direct and indirect  effects  that the reform  has had on
the creation  (or "adoption')  of new financial instruments.  We broadly interpret  the creation of new
financial instruments  as the  process that  finally allows pension  funds  to invest  in a wider variety of
alternatives.  In the early  eighties,  corporate  bonds  were ("in practice")  new  financial  instruments.
They became relatively important in the pension  fund portfolios in the  early nineties  (also see Table
2).  Similarly,  authorized  in  1985, investment  in  equity became a "new"  alternative  that helped the
development  of this  market.  Iglesias  (1998)  uses  this  case  to  point out how  the coordination  of
different reforms may have positive effects  on capital market  development:  the initial investment  in
equity  by  pension  funds  was  in  concurrently  privatized  firms.  Risk-rating  requirements  were
implemented at the same time.3'
In  1989, the law allowed the  formation  of closed-end  mutual funds, whose  only significant
clients  have  been  the pension  funds.  Three  kinds  of funds  have  been  created:  real  estate  funds,
equity funds and "company development"  funds  (similar to venture  capital, but more conservative).
In  1998,  about 3 percent of pension  funds  were invested  in these  instruments.  These instruments
face  three  problems:  by  their  very nature,  they  are  long-term investments  and  they  do  not have
secondary  markets.  Second,  their valuation  is  difficult,  and despite  recent  changes,  valuations  lag
behind other market-valued  instruments.  Third,  after the recent  restructuring of the pension  fund
industry there are fewer portfolio managers.  Thus, existing upper limits to property concentration in
m  The existing stock expired  and no more government  bonds were issued. This reflects  the fiscal discipline
adopted by the government in the context of important structural reforms.
30 See Walker (1998).
31 For anecdotal evidence regarding this issue, see Camus and Sanchez (1998, p. 139).
33the  close-end  funds  curtail  their growth possibilities.  It is  only  through  these indirect  investment
vehicles  that pension  funds in Chile can participate  in private  equity.  Due to the  difficulties  related
with  lack  of liquidity,  valuation  problems  and  industry  concentration,  this  market  has  not  been
significantly  developed.  This  supports  our  view  regarding  the  incentives  faced  by  portfolio
managers.
The "Bonos  de Reconocimiento"  are zero-coupon  indexed  bonds  that are originated  as the
recognition of the State's liability with contributors  to the old pension system that chose to move to
the  new  system.  These  are  highly  demanded  by  insurance  companies  because  of  asset-liability
matching requirements.  In December  31  1987, Law  18681  authorized affiliates to transfer the Bono
de  Reconocimiento  to  the  insurance  companies.  In March  10  1990,  Law  18964  authorized  these
bonds  to be endorsed and the trading of these bonds began  (AFPs could not buy them yet).  Finally,
in March  19  1994  law 19301  authorized AFPs to purchase  such bonds, in order to allow affiliates  to
obtain  early  pensions.32 This  illustrates  the positive  unexpected  consequences  of pension  reform,
which  we  associate  with  institutional  capital.  Given  the  experience  with  these  bonds,  stripped
coupons  originated from Central Bank paper (PRC)  can now be traded separately.
The "Mutuos  Hipotecarios"  were  created especially for life insurance companies.  They are a
kind of illiquid mortgage  bond whose  only guarantee  is the  specific real  estate property behind the
debt.  They are  not traded in  formal markets  because of their  heterogeneity,  so pension  funds can
not buy them directly.  Indirectly,  pension  funds  have bought these instruments  through  real estate
funds.  From the perspective  of insurance  companies, these  instruments  compete  with  the  "Letras
Hipotecarias",  a mortgage bond backed by a portfolio  of real  estate  and guaranteed  by commercial
banks.  The latter are eligible investments  for pension funds.
"New"  is  also  the  possibility  of investing  abroad.  In  March  1990,  pension  funds  were
allowed  to  invest  only  in  foreign  fixed-income  issued  by  G7  govemments.  As  of  1993,  total
investment  in these instruments was 0.6 percent.  In 2000, after having gained considerable expertise
and important  legal reforms,  and because  the expectations  of domestic  currency  appreciation  were
reversed, they had invested  11  percent, mainly in equity mutual funds.
Our analysis  thus  far may suffer  from  survivorship  bias.  Indeed, not  all  efforts  have been
successful.  For instance,  real  estate  corporations  (Sociedades  Inmobiliarias)  were  especially  created
for pension  funds.  Two of them disappeared  by mid-1995, after 4 years in business.  This happened
32 We thank Augusto Iglesias for this information.
34because  from the  perspective  of pension  funds  they had relative  tax disadvantages  with respect to
real  estate investment  funds, which  are tax exempt.  Also,  in 1991,  significant  efforts were put into
developing  risk-rating  procedures  for  commercial  paper  and  "projects  without  history".  Neither
ever attracted pension  funds despite  passing the rating barrier.  Finally,  in  1994  the law  created the
"securitized credits  funds" which have not existed so far.
B.  Argentina
In  the  case  of  Argentina,  the  "Common  Investment  Funds"  (Fondos  Comunes  de
Inversi6n)  that were created especially  for pension funds in 1992 are important.33 They represented
8.4  percent  of the pension  funds  in  2000.  To  the  same  list we  can  add  "negotiable  obligations",
mortgage  securitization  and  leasing  contracts.34  Negotiable  obligations  must  be  held  until  their
maturity (of about two years),  since they do not have  a secondary market.  Panel B of Table 2 shows
that the  size of this market  has grown  5-fold since  1992.  Of the total amount invested in this type
of security,  banks  issued  about  51  percent  in  1994  and  only  9  percent  in  1998.  This  reflects  a
significant increase in the relative importance of the corporate bond market for pension  funds.
Regarding  bank  deposits,  in  December of 1998  95  percent  of them  had  variable rates  of
return.  For these variable-rate  deposits  the principal  is  secured,  but  the interest  is  tied to  certain
security-price  indices  such as  Merval,  S&P, Bovespa., etc.  These instruments  became popular in the
context  of  rising  markets,  which  is  also  consistent  with  our  hypothesis  regarding  investment
incentives.
C.  Peri
Regarding  Peru,  despite  the short  history  after  the reform,  its impact  seems  to  have  been
more important than in  Chile.  For example, the percentage invested in private corporations  is rather
large (above  50 percent  since  1997).  The relative  importance of this asset class  almost  doubled in
1996, when  newly  issued  central  government  bonds  were  no  longer  available.  Interestingly,  the
corporate  bond  market  was  very  small  before  the  investment  by  pension  funds.  Of the  total
invested in corporations,  only about 7 percentage points corresponds to privatized equity. 3 ;
Since July 1998, pension funds have been allowed  to invest in Brady Bonds representative  of
Peruvian  sovereign  debt.  These bonds  really  are a  hybrid,  less risky than  local bonds,  since  they
33  Law 24083 of 1992.  See AFAP,  1998.
34 Decree  1073  (1993), Law 24411  (1995) and Decree 627  (1996), respectively.
35have  as  collateral  zero  coupon bonds issued by  the Treasury  of the  Unites States.  Therefore, even
though they are not "new" in international  markets, thev are so in the local markets.
It is also interesting to remember  another feature of the Peruvian  system: the importance  of
the  financial  sector.  Within  this  sector,  two  relatively  new  instruments  are  worth  noting  -
subordinated  bonds  and leasing  bonds.  Comparing  Tables  2  and  10, we  see  for  1998  that of the
total invested in the financial sector,  55 percent corresponded  to time  deposits, 25 percent to leasing
bonds and the rest to subordinated  bonds.  Leasing bonds have matun'ties  ranging from 3 to 5 years.
Thev  are  used  to  finance  leasing  operations  by  banks  (which  have  important  tax  advantages  for
firms)  and are  supposed  to be  liquid and  low risk.  They are issued  in soles,  dollars  and VAC  (the
CPI indexed unit).  The size of this market has grown 11-fold  since  1992,  to exceed  2 bn US dollars
after  1998.  Subordinated bonds, on the other hand, are indexed  and longer-term  (10-year maturity).
These bonds  are converted into stocks if the issuing bank  faces  financial  difficulties.  They are  thus
considered  as  equity  for  the  purposes  of  calculating  debt  ratios  for  the  issuing  bank.  As  in
Argentina,  Peru  had a  small  fraction  invested in variable option-like  bonds ("bonos  estructurados'",
but their inadequate valuation has limited their  success.  There have been only two issues.
The usage of the VAC  as the  currency  for some debts is interesting.  As Ramos  (1999) notes,
this  currency  unit may allow for a better  matching of assets and liabilities  for certain  firms,  such as
those  oriented  to  mass  consumption  and  public  utilities.  Better  matching  reduces  expected
bankruptcy  costs,  creating  a  net  social  gain.  It is  argued  that without  the  pension  funds,  these
instruments would have hardly appeared.  Pension funds  seem to be natural buyers of these bonds,
but in 1998 only  10 percent of the total private  bonds they held were  denominated  in VAC.  In any
case, an  average  25  percent of the total bonds  issued is  denominated in  VAC.  This may be better
understood in the context of a highly "dollarized" economy.
The  above  analysis  allows  us  to  stress  three  simple  ideas:  First,  the  importance  of  a
consistent  institutional/legal  environment.  In  this  context,  tax  incentives,  investment  limits  and
adequate  valuation  mechanisms  may  be  determinants  of  success.  Second,  not  all  innovations
proposed by pension funds,  analysts  and other  observers  to the authority  end up being successful.
Third, a requirement  seems to be that pension fund managers  find  expected returns "attractive" at a
35  Here again we can  see how refonns can be linked to each other.
36given stage of development of the pension system, in order to push  for the development of the new
instruments.  36
III.6  Secondary  effects  on the financial system's structure and other markets
A.  Chile
In  Chile,  one of the industries  that have had an enormous growth  due to  the reform is  the
life and disability insurance industry.  They  managed more than 10 billion US dollars in assets  as  of
1998, more  than  ten  times  the amounts  managed  in  1981.  This  has created  a  specific clientele  for
long-term assets.
Iglesias  (1998)  argues  that after  pension reform in Chile, bank disintermediation  has  existed
but that it has  been  limited.  However,  it is  clear that in the presence  of a well-developed  pension
system  new long-term  financing  alternatives  do  appear,  particularly for larger  firms.  For example,
Hemrndez  and  Walker  (1993)  find  significant  changes  in  debt  levels  and  composition  when
comparing the 1978-81  averages with  those of 1988-1991.  Although the total debt/equity ratios fall,
particularly  in  the  tradable  sector,  longer-term  debt  becomes  more  important  and  bank-debt
becomes  less  so.  However,  in the non-tradable  sector,  short-term  bank debt retains its importance.
The  overall  reliance  on bond  financing increases  significantly  in the  latter  sub period.  These  facts
jointly  suggest  that bank  disintermediation  has  occurred  to  a  certain  extent  after  pension  reform.
However, it is also  likely that the reform has  contributed by making financial markets  grow.  In fact,
M7  multiplied  10-fold  between  1981  and  2000  (Table  2)  and  pension  funds  provide  about  15
percent of total bank funding  (including mortgages and time  deposits).  Since the mid 1990's, banks
are expected  to concentrate  on shorter-term  financing and  smaller firms.  For these firms,  pension
fund financing may be too expensive given the formal requirements  (risk rating, prospectus,  regular
publication of financial  statements, etc. See Iglesias, 1998).
Diamond and Valdes  (1994)  mention the induced  development  of the mortgage industry in
Chile.  Since  the very beginning, both pension  funds and life insurance companies  have invested  in
Letras Hipotecarias.  This,  along with  the more recent appearance  of the Mutuos Hipotecarios,  has
helped the development  of the  housing and  office  markets.  As of 2000,  14.4  percent of pension
funds  were  invested  in  mortgage  bonds.  They  held  approximately  56  percent  of the  total  stock
outstanding  of Letras  (Table  2).  Using the information  in Walker (1998,  Table 3),  when insurance
36 As noticed, incentives are different for defined-benefit pension systems.
37companies  are also included this number goes up to an equivalent  80 percent, but in the latter figure
we  also  include  Mutuos.  This  means  that  a very large proportion  of the  total  real estate  funding
comes  from insurance  companies  and pension funds.  Here it is important to keep in mind another
of the  previously identified concurrent  conditions:  to a certain  extent the successful  development  of
a  long-term  mortgage  market  has  been  possible  due  to  the  existence  of  inflation  protection
mechanisms  (the so-called "Unidad de Fomento").
Other indirect effects may come as a consequence  of the  foreign investment  by the pension
funds.  First, we have  observed the  creation  of local  retail mutual funds  that also invest out of the
national borders.  Second, it is likely to deepen  the foreign currency market.
B.  Argentina
An important  fraction  of the total  portfolio is  held in  government  bonds.  This  has  helped
financing  the  deficit  produced  as  a consequence  of such  reform.  An advantage  is  that  now  this
happens  at  transparent  market  prices.  Regarding  the  possibility  of bank  disintermediation,  the
proportion invested  in banks is  similar to what has been  invested  in private  corporations.  Thus, a
crowding out effect is not clear.
C.  Peru
The absence  of deep, liquid government  bond markets has  led pension  funds in Peru to use
bank  deposits  as  the  "safe  asset".  Thus,  although  pension  funds  hold  only  a  3.3  percent  of
outstanding  deposits  (Table  2),  the  financial  sector  represents  about  one-third  of  their  total
portfolio.  The  ratio  of  the  total  funds  provided  by  the  pension  funds  to  their  investment  in
corporate  bonds and  stocks is  0.7  times.  This  means  that  even if pension  funds  had the  effect of
crowding  out banks  from  large  firm  financing,  banks  have got  back  most  of the  funding,  which
allows  them  to  develop  related  businesses.  Two  of  those have  been  the leasing  bonds  and  the
subordinated  bonds.  Ramos  (1999)  argues  that pension  funds  have  provided  flexible  funding  to
banks and that,  given that the former prefer positions in local currency,  the latter have been able  to
develop  a deep  currency  forward market.  The productive  sector has benefited  from these  hedging
possibilities,  so we see again a reduction in expected bankruptcy  costs.  Altogether, disintermediation
does not seem relevant in this case.
38The evidence  seems  to suggest  the  claim  that pension  fund reform  has positive  secondary
effects  in other related markets,  allowing  more  efficient  fund allocation.  This may have important
long-term implications.
IV.  PANEL DATA EVIDENCE
In this  section,  we use country panel  data to provide additional  formal  tests  to some of the
hypotheses  presented  earlier  in  this  paper,  using data  from  multiple  countries.  This  adds  to  the
qualitative  and time  series  evidence provided  in  the  above  sections.  In particular,  we want to test
two hypotheses  regarding the  effect of pension reform  on capital market development.  First, does
allowing pension fund managers  to invest in  stocks decreases  the cost of capital for firms?  Second,
does volatility decline  as pension fund managers increase  their investments in stocks.
IV.1  Data
We use annual data  for 33 emerging economies.  The list of countries  was  selected from  the
IFC  Emerging  Markets  database  and includes  seven Latin  American  economies  and at  least eight
economies  where  there  is  some  sort of competitive  allocation  of pension  funds  toward  private
securities.  The countries included in this list are presented in the Annex.
As a proxy of the  firm's cost of capital we use dividend yields and price to book ratios from
the IFC  Emerging  Markets  Database.  The volatility  variable  was  constructed  for  each  country  as
discussed previously in the paper.  We take the year-end value for each country.
As  for  the  explanatory  variables  we use three  different  sets.  For the  first  set, we consider
data on  the extent  of pension  fund  investment  in local  firms.  Within  this  set,  we  consider  four
different measures.  First, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after pension  funds start investing
in equity  and zero  before.  Second,  we construct  a measure  of the investment  in stocks by pension
funds  (the log  of.  Third, we  consider  the  relative  importance  of the  investment  in  stocks  and
private bonds on  the total market  cap calculated  in the IFC database  (as in Table 4).  Finally, we use
a measure of the total pension funds to GDP for each country-year in the sample.
39A  second  set  of explanatory  variables  controls  for  what  we  have  called  the  "concurrent
conditions".  To this end, we used the per-capita income as a general measure of the development  of
the country,  the  annual inflation  rate  as  an indicator  of macroeconomic  stability, and  the  assets  of
deposit monev banks to GDP as a measure of the development of capital markets.
For the  set of Latin American  countries  in our sample, we also used a set of index  variables
indicating  the  extent  of reform  in  the  different  areas  of the  economies.  These  variables  were
obtained  from  Morley,  Machado  and  Pettinato  (1999)  and  constitute  a proxy  for  the  concurrent
conditions.  We considered indicators of reform in  five areas:  tax reform, privatization, international
financial  liberalization,  domestic  financial  reform  and  external  trade  reform.  The  indexes  are
normalized  to be between  zero and one, with one being the most reformed.  They were constructed
from different  components.37 Refcap measures  the extent  of international  financial  liberalization  and
is  constructed  taking  into  account  foreign  investment,  limits  on  repatriation,  capital  controls  and
capital  outflows.  Refcom  measures  trade reform  and  considers  the average  level  and dispersion  of
tariffs  in  each  country.  Reffiz  measures  the  extent  of domestic  financial  reform  and  considers
controls  on  interest  rates  and  reserve  requirements.  Refbi is  an index  measuring  the  size  of the
government sector in the economy.  Finally, Reftax measures  tax reform and considers marginal rates
on personal and corporate  taxes, VAT rates and VAT collection  efficiency.
IV.2  Estimation procedure
The  estimation  of panel  data  regressions  was  performed  using  the  OLS  fixed  effects
estimator  and  the  GLS  pooled  estimator.  The  main  consideration  when  estimating  panel  data
regressions  is,  of course,  the  adequate  treatment  of the  unobserved  individual  effects.  Of the
possible procedures  to deal with this problem,  we ruled out the estimation  of GLS  random effects
because  of the  small cross-section  dimension  of our  data.  We  are  therefore  left with  the  fixed-
effects  procedure  or with trying to capture the individual  effects  through  observable  time  invariant
variables.
The  problem  with  the  fixed-effects  estimator  is  that  it  does  not  consider  the  variation
between  units but only within units.  In other words, the cross  sectional variation  is disregarded  and
only the time  series  variation within units  is considered in order to estimate the  coefficients.  Since
most  of the  action  we  hope  to  capture  with  our  model  occurs  between  units,  the  fixed-effects
estimator is not very useful for our purposes.
40Alternatively,  we  consider  pooled  estimation  of  the  panel  data  using  observable  time-
invariant variables  in order to capture the systematic differences  between units.  In particular, we use
the geographic  location  of the country and  the value  of the dependent variable  the year  before  the
starting date of our estimation sample  as proxies  for the unobserved differences among units.
IV.3  Estimation results
A.  Impact of pension funds on the cost of capital
The  first set  of regressions  is  presented  in Table  11.  The  table  shows  the results  of GLS
pooled panel data estimations  of two measures  of firm  cost of capital  on pension  fund investment
decisions and a set  of controls.  The  table is  organized in two  panels.  Panel I  presents  the results
obtained using the log of the dividend yield at the  end of the year on a specific measure of "pension
fund importance" and a set of controls.  Panel II  has  the same  structure but the dependent variable
corresponds  to the log of the price-to-book  ratio.  Each  panel has  four columns with  one for each
different measure of pension  fund importance.
The  first indicator  of pension  fund importance  is  a  dummy  variable  taking  the value  one
when for a country in a specific year there are private pension  funds invested in private stocks.  The
second column uses  the ratio of total pension  fund assets  to GDP as an indicator of pension  fund
investing activity.  The third column uses the ratio of total pension fund investments  on shares  and
private  bonds  to  market  cap.  The  fourth  column  uses  the  log  of pension  fund  investments  in
stocks.  The  four columns presented  in the table  in addition  include  the set of controls  previously
described.  A full set of time-dumrnies was included in each regression.
The  results  presented  in the  first  panel of Table  11  show  that regardless  of the indicator
used,  pension  fund  importance  significantly  decreases  the  average  dividend  yield,  which  would
indicate  a  reduction  in the  effective  cost  of capital.  It shows  that the  proxies  for the unobserved
individual  effects  are  significant.  Panel  II of Table  11  shows  that in a  similar  way that, the  more
important pension  funds  are, the higher is the price  to book ratio of firms  in a particular  country.
Therefore, this would indicate  that the pension funds  significantly decrease firms' cost of capital.
Notice  also  that, in  all  cases, inflation,  as  a measure  of stability,  has  the  expected  sign.  In
addition,  the initial conditions  for both the dividend-yield  and the price to book ratio are significant
capturing the presence of exogenous differences  between countries.
37  See Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999) for a detailed explanation  of  the different indexes.
41B.  Impact of pension funds on volatility
Table  12  presents  the  same  kind of evidence  in  the  case  of market  volatility.  It shows  a
negative  and  statistically  significant  relationship  between  market  volatility  and  pension  fund
importance.  The  table also  indicates  that market  volatility  is  positively  related  with  inflation  rates
and negatively related to per-capita income, as expected.
The  validity  of  the  previous  analysis  depends  on  that  of the  control  variables  used  as
indicators  of what we have  defined  as the "concurrent  conditions".  Using the reform indexes  for
seven Latin  American countries  provided by  Morley, Machado  and Pettinato (1999)  we further test
the hypothesis  that pension reform  reduces cost of capital and stock market volatility.  Although for
this purpose we have  to reduce  our sample, we hope that this procedure  allows  us to control for the
effect of other reforms.  These are,  successively,  capital account liberalization, trade reform, financial
reform, privatization  and  tax reform.  It is important to notice that none of these  reform variables
include  directly the  effect of pension  fund  reform,  and that using them we  should control  for the
critical competitor of pension  reform: international opening of capital account  (Refca ).
Tables  13  and 14 show the results  for dividend yield, price to book ratios and volatility after
controlling  for the  degree of reform in different  areas  of the economy.  We use  pooled estimation
and  fixed-effects  estimation  for  each  of the  four  measures  of pension  fund  importance:  dummv
variable;  the  ratio  of  total  pension  fund  assets  to  GDP;  the  ratio  between  total  pension  fund
investments  on  shares and private  bonds, and market cap; and the log of pension  fund investments
on stocks.  The tables present  GLS pooled estimation  and OLS fixed effects  estimation.  We do not
provide random effects estimation  due to the small number of cross-sectional units.
The results are  mixed.  First, in general we do not find any significant  effects of pension  fund
reform  on dividend-yields.  Moreover,  using fixed effects estimation and the ratio and log of pension
fund  investments  on  stocks  as  explanatory  variables  we  find,  contrary  to  what  we  expected,  a
positive  and  significant  effect.  That is,  pension  funds  investments  would  tend  to increase  cost of
capital when  measured  as the dividend yield, which  does not make much sense.  On the other hand,
42the only  reform index  that  significantly  affects  dividend  yields is  the  capital  account  liberalization
index that would reduce the cost of capital.3"
Second,  GLS  pooled  estimation  indicates  that,  after  controlling  for  the  effect  of other
reforms,  pension reform  significantly  increases  price-to-book  ratios,  and thus, would  decrease  the
cost of capital, as expected.  Of the five reform variables,  the degree of capital account openness and
the tax reform index seem to be the most important in explaining price-to-book  ratios.  Finally, we
do not find any significant effect of the pension fund variables on stock market volatility.
Therefore,  these  results  partly  contradict  those  found  in  the previous  sections.  However,
this  could be simply due to the fact  that there  are very serious  problems in measuring the depth of
the  different  reforms  in  different  countries,  and  that  these  indices  usually  are  constructed  with a
degree  of  arbitartiness  and  subjective  judgement.  Thus,  these  last  results  could  be  due  to
measurement problems.
3  Although  several  coefficients  in this  set of regressions  are insignificant,  the estimations  present relatively
high R2.  This partly happens  because we use GLS cross-sectional weights in the estimation.  Another reason
for  this  phenorrenon  could be  a  multicollinearity  problem  among  the reform  indicators.  Table  15  shows
cross-correlation  among the five reform indices.  The table shows that although there is  ample variation,  the
correlation tends to be high.
43V.  CONCLUSIONS
We  have considered evidence of very different nature (anecdotal,  casuistic,  qualitative,  simple
data  and econometric)  to  analyze  several  hypotheses  regarding  the  impact  of pension  reform  on
capital  markets.  Overall,  the  evidence  seems  to  be  consistent  with  the  claims  by  advocates  of
reform.
The  accumulation of institutional capital is an  important side  effect  of reform in  every
country  analyzed  in more detail.  We do find evidence  of an adaptive  legal  framework, of increased
specialization  in  the  investment  decision-making  process,  of  "transparency  and  integrity"
(particularly via the mandatory risk-rating process),  and also of a new corporate governance balance,
particularly for Chile, which has the oldest reform.
Regarding the effect  on the cost of capital, the econometric  analyses, with both  time-series
and pooled estimation  techniques, indicate that dividend yields are  lower (stock prices and price-to-
books  larger)  with  reform.  We  present  certain  evidence  that  at  least  for  the  case  of Chile,
transaction costs have decreased  as a side effect of pension reform  and asset accumulation.  We also
find  econometric,  time-series  evidence  of  increased  liquidity.  The  evidence  also  favors  the
hypothesis  of lower security-price volatility  after reform.  Volatility would be lower both in absolute
value and also in terms of the sensitivity  to external  shocks (systematic risk).
The  linkage  between  financial  market  integration  and  pension  reform  is  somewhat
weaker.  However,  during the different  phases of the process  of integration  (the entrance  of capital
flows to a country,  the access  to foreign capital in its diverse forms by local firms and the investment
abroad by local investors) pension  funds  have an important and distinct role.
The qualitative  evidence  regarding  the creation  of new financial instruments is very clear
for  all  countries  analyzed  and  the  institutional  environment  always  plays  a  central  role.  As  per
secondary effects  on the financial  system's structure and other markets,  effects on industries directly
related with  the  reform  are  almost  tautologically  present.  One interesting  result however  is  that
there does not seem to be bank "disintermediation"  although  after reform  the role of banks is likely
44to  change.  Altogether,  perhaps  one  of the  most important  effects  is  an  improvement in  fund
allocation for investment  purposes, which  should translate  into  a better resource  allocation.  This
could have permanent positive effects on growth and welfare, even if total savings are not affected.
Regarding panel data evidence,  the results presented in this paper show that regardless  of the
indicator  used,  pension  fund  importance  significantly  decreases  the  average  dividend  yield  and
increases  price  to  book  ratios.  We  also  find  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  relationship
between market volatility and pension fund importance.
Finally,  when  we restrict  the  sample  to  only  7  Latin  American  economies  and control  for
other reforms  using reform indices results are mixed.  In this case, we do not find  significant effects
of pension  funds on dividend-yields  but  they do seem to significantly  increase  price-to-book  ratios.
Finally,  we  do  not  find  any  significant  effect  of pension  fund  reform  on  stock  market volatility.
However, these particular results are  probably subject to important measurement error problems.
In  the  context  of  the  existing  literature,  our  results  imply  somewhat  different  types  of
support for the effect of pension reform on long-term growth and welfare.  Consistent with Levine
and Zervos  (1998),  Rousseau  and Wachtel  (1998) and  Arestis, Demetriades  and Luintel (2001)  they
highlight the importance of the "capital  markets  channel".  However, here we argue that it is higher
risk  tolerance  and longer  investment  horizons  on  the part  institutional  investors  (with  respect  to
individual investors  or banks)  which  imply lower cost of capital.  The analysis of Prowse (1998)  and
Catalan,  Impavido  and  Musalem  (2000)  relate it to  a  reduced liquidity  premium  (or willingness  to
invest in  illiquid  alternatives).  This may  be less  likely  in the  context of a competitive  individual-
account-based-defined-contribution  system, however.
Using  Granger  causality  tests  Catalan  et  al  argue  that  contractual  savings  lead  the
development  of capital  markets.  Our  results  are  generally  consistent  with theirs.  However,  as  in
their case, it is difficult to control  for other reforms.  Granger causality  tests are not free from biases
associated with the simultaneous  effects of concurrent reforms.  Alternatively, we provide qualitative
evidence  supporting the idea that  "institutional  capital  accumulation"  has  been quite important  for
the development of capital markets  in  the three  cases  studied here.  We expect  this to be especially
true for countries with a  civil law  tradition.  Therefore, we do find a few "hard" links, but the "soft"
links may be just as important.
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53TABLES
TABLE 1
INSTITUTIONAL  CAPITAL: EVIDENCE
CHILE  ARGENTINA  PERU  OTHERS
ADAPTIVE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
- ValdWs  and  Cifuentes  (1990,  'Tables I anid  2)  - The  mere discussion  of the  pension  reform  - 'i'he  Peru\ian  pension  refornt  cf December  Mexico
present a list  of 15  legal modifications  related  in Argentina  took  morc than  two  years  to be  1992  was  the  most important  reform  of the  'he  complementaty  pension  reform
\with  pension  reform. Arrau  (1994)  adds three  prepared  implcmented,  wehich  oiccurred  in  recent  years.  It  is  expected  to  have  a  (Sisema  de  Ahorro  para  el  Rcuro,  SAR)
additional  ones.  Iglesias  (1999)  mentons  that  1993. (Mttrolo,  1995)  significant  impact  oti  the  economy.  (Blartia,  required  significant modifications  to tie social
in  all,  some  25  such  reforms  base  been  1995)
in all,  some  25  such  refoims  have  been  - At  least  19  reforms  to  capital  market  laws  sccurity  and housing lawvs.  (Farell,  1995)
related  with  the  investment  and  transparency  .
and  28  resolutions  are  associated  xwith  the  - Ihe  financial  systems  faces  two  impulses:
requiremen1ts  of pension  funds.  Clml
accumulation  of pension  funds (ASAI',  1998,  liberalization  of  the  economy  and  nes  rules
- The  process  of reforms has been  continuous  p.15
7-
158,  p. 165-169).  that seek  the modernization  and developmettt  - Pension reform  was approved  in  December
and  mostly  caused  or  at  least  accelerated  by  of  the  capital  market,  in  the  cotitxI  of  1993 after  a long legislative  debate.  'I'he  nes
pension  funds.  institutional  investors  that  require  increasing  system  started  to  operate  in  April  1994.
investment opportunities  (Ilamos,  1999)  (Akyala,  1995)
- P'ension  funds  directly  participate  in  the
formulation of (or observations  to) newv  law s.
For  examplc,  there  was  joint  wvork  of
indepetident  professionals  with the  regulatory
atithorities  to  formulate  the  Capital  Market
Reform  of  1994.  Pension  funds  aceively
participated  in the  final stage of the process.
- Added  flexibility to  the norms regarding  the
investment  of  pension  funds  abroad,
including  the  use  currency  forward  contracts
as  hedging instruments  (this  was not  initially
considered  in the 1994 law).
54INCREASED SPECIALIZATION  IN THE INVESTMENT  DECISION-MAKING  PROCESS
- 'I'he  latest  information  services  and  - Initially,  technology  was  transferred  from  - Initially  tcchnolog)y  was  transfcrred  from
technologies  are  used  for  managing  pension  Chilean  counterparts  at  all  levels  (official and  Chilean  counterparts  at  all  levels  (official  and
funds, given  the  competitive  advantage  that  private).  private).
they provide
- Use  of  latest  information  services  anid  - Use  of  latest  information  seanices  atnd
- Security  issuers  have  rounds  of  technology  technology
"conversations"  with  pension  funds  and  life
insurance  companies  (AFPs arenotallowed-  Contact with security issuers  - Authorization  of  the  invcstment  in  Urady
insurance  companies  (AFPs  are  not  allowedbodreuesapciclanngrcssn
to  "negotate"  and  determine  prices  in  bonds  requires  a specific  learning  process  in
advance  to the  actual  trading).  For  example,  order  to operate  in  that  market
fees  and  investment  policies  of  local  - Contact  with security  issuers
investment  funds  are  negotiated  with  AFPs.
T'he  required  credibility  increases  the
counterparts'  professionalism.
- Investing  in  "new"  instruments  (such  as
forward  contracts)  requires  a  continuous
learning  process
- With  the  internationalization  of  local
pension  fund  investments,  technology  is
transferred  from  foreign  fund managers.
CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  BALANCE
- Investors  pretending  to  obtain  or  increasc  - A  newv  bankruptcy law  is implemented  (Lawv - AFPs  actively  promoted  that  large  firms  be
cotitrol  of fums  usually  explain  their plans  to  24.552 of 1995).  eligiblc  (paying  themselves  the  related
pension  funds,  and  consider  their opinion  as  expenses).
(sometimes  small  but)  influential
shareholders.  ~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-  Being  "Al
7
Pable"  became  a  nlew  status,
shareholders.
reflecting  information  transparency  (Ramos,
- AFPs  are  required  to  vote  for independent  1999)
candidates  to  be  members  of  the  board  of
directors  where  funds are invested
- During  the  board  member  clcction  period,
55negotiations  among pension  funds take place,
in order to determine  the names of candidates
that  pass  the  independenice  requirements
estabhlished  by law.
- 'Ihe  Association of Pension  Funds (ASAfl')
informs  authorities  and the  public opinion  in
general about corporate  governance  situations
that are negative  for pension  funds.
- AFI's  are  typically  required  by  the
Superiotendence  to  file  reports  regarding
events  or transactons  by security  issuer,  that
may  have  negative  effects  on  pension  fund
insestments.
TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY
- Risk  ratng requiremcnts  are  mandatory  and  - Significant  coiordination  betwccn  the Central  - Supeointendence  has  significant  powers  and  Mexic
custodians  are  authorized by the Central Bank  Bank  the  superintendence  of pensions  and  kceps  good  communication  levels  wvith  Implementation  of this  system  has  required
of Chile.  the Comisi6n Nacional de Valores  (CNV)  has  pension  funds  and  their  association.  (Barua,  informationi  exchange  anid  coordination
been  required.  An intense  supervisio)n  process  1995)
- In  1985  pension  funds  themselves  had  ti  . . among  finianicial  institutions,  employces  and
is  an  ongoing cosncern.  (MaNtu,l  1995)
evaluate  securites'  risks,  according  to  . - Risk  ratitg requirements  are  mandatory  and  regulatory authorities.  (FarrIl,  1995)
parameters  estabbshed  by  the  authorities.  - Risk rating  requirements  are  mandatory  and  custodians  are authorized  by the CONASFV.  Colombia
'I'his  mcant  a  cosntinuous  exchange  of  custodians are  authorined  by  the CNV,
information  betwcen  security  issuers,  . W  - At  least  50  percent  must  be  invested  via
39  - With  fewv  exceptions,  transactions must  take  initially required  (Baruia,  1995)  capital  market,  government  bonds  were
authorites  and pension  funds.  place in  transparent secondary  markets
- In  1998  the  market considered  nsk  rating as  expected  to offer conmpetitive  rates.
- T'hc  1994  lawv  also  lcd  to  the  consolidation  - Valuation of funds is mostly at market pices  a  normal  procedurc;  the  ad  huc  commission  system
of  independent  risk-rating  agencies.  In  thi-  CN  as  ended.  Four private  rating  agencies  xvith  is  expected  to  expand  the  availability  of
context,  the  Risk  ltating  Commission  V  requires  additional  transparency  inexpert  partners  xisted.  amos  999)
(Coni.isi6n  Clasificadora  de  .esgo.  CCR)  transactions  by  firms  that  issue  securities  fefinancial  enstruxents,  partly  through
changes  its  role,  by  considering  these  (Resolution 262,  1995)  - With  few exceptions,  transactions  must take  "securitzation", anid  to provide  incentives  for
place  in transparent  secondary  markets  firms  to  become  open  to  external  capital. independent  ratings  to  formulate  its  ov  Aaa  95
opinion  regarding  the  eligibility  by  pension  - Conflicts of interest  are strongly regulated  (Ayala,  1995)
funds  of certain  instruments.  CCR  is  partly
'  See Camus and  Sanchez (1998)  regarding  anecdotal evidence with  respect to the evolution of risk-rating  in Chile.
56composed  of  independent  professionals  - Valuation of funds  is mostly at market prices
designated  by the pension funds.
- With  fewv  exceptions,  transactions  must  take
place in transparent secondary markets
- Conflicts of interest are strongly regulated
- Valuaton of funds  at market prices
57TABLE 2
Share of Pension  Funds in Financial Markets  and Size of Each  Market
(December  of each  year)
A. Chile
Year  Goverment Debt  Time  Deposits and  Mortage Bonds  Corporate  Bonds  Equity
Bank Bonds
PF Inv.  Market  Size  PF Inv.  Market Slze  PF lIw.  Market  Size  PF Inv.  Market Size  PF Inv.  Market  Size
(%)  (USS  MM)  (%)  M7  (%)  (US$  MM)  (%)  (US$ MM)  (%)  (US$  MM)
(2)  (1)  (US$  MM)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
(3)
1981  0.7  301.3  3.0  6,320-2  2.2  1,296.5  1.9  96.1  0.0  7,049.8
1982  30.8  431.4  4.5  3,586.9  24.9  1,144.9  1.3  287.4  0.0  4,388.6
1983  31.5  1,100.4  1.0  6,610.7  44.8  1,289.4  9.3  268.0  0.0  2,598.5
1984  24.7  1,309.2  6.0  5,837.3  44.0  1,236.4  10.2  229.0  0.0  2,105.8
1985  46.5  755.2  11.9  6,235.8  48.2  1,125.1  7.7  222.0  0.0  2,012.0
1986  71.6  612.2  17.6  7,594.6  44.2  1,223.5  11.1  142.0  3.2  4,061.7
1987  88.2  367.3  20.5  9,195.7  46.9  1,266.5  27.1  264.0  5.3  5,341.4
1988  31.9  606.7  22.5  11,465.2  53.0  1,393.0  48.1  486.0  4.2  6,912.0
1989  40.7  364.4  19.1  13,828.9  52.1  1,518.6  47.8  862.0  4.8  9,405.6
1990  39.5  269.7  20.1  17,166.2  57.7  1,852.0  59.2  1,256.0  5.5  13,618.6
1991  38.0  238.4  18.8  21,192.4  58.6  2,304.8  62.4  1,791.0  8.6  27,898.3
1992  39.9  528.1  14.9  26,880.2  60.8  2,884.7  60.3  1,972.0  10.0  29,128.3
1993  46.3  172.2  11.3  30,240.3  57.3  3,644.7  54.9  2,056.0  9.9  51,368.7
1994  52  1  16,978.2  3.7  38,362.8  57.4  5,294.2  57.2  2,451.7  11.1  67,681.6
1995  52.3  19,158.0  3.6  46,472.6  55.7  7,212.6  55.3  2,410.1  11.0  71,177.5
1996  55.2  20,971.6  3.0  53,803.0  55.4  8,875.4  55.5  2,315.1  11.1  65,844.0
1997  50.8  23,997 4  6.0  63,186.7  49.3  10,600.8  53.2  1,901.5  10.4  71,831.6
1998  63.8  19,936.5  24.4  63,067.8  50.2  10,265.4  51.9  2,255.6  8.9  51,809.2
1999  62.6  19,149.1  10.1  62,425.4  51.8  10,095.0  51.0  2,573.7  6.3  68,499.0
2000  65.0  19,738.3  11.8  63,059.1  56.4  9,146.0  39.8  3,642.8  6.9  60,513.6
So--ce  1981-1994,  W.lkeeni,d  Wmeon  (1999).
(I I  S-ce  1994,  eceree.  - eSpnedenc  de  Ad.-  nrodomei  de  Fondon  de  Peosienee.
(21  Snce  994, -curce  Supnnendenc,a  de  Valores  y  Segunes.
(3 Snce  1994,  osu-  B-Bnco  C.nul de  Chfle.
B. Argentina
Year  Goverment Debt  Time  Deposits  Mortage Bonds  Negotiable Obligations  Equity
PF  Inv.  Market Size  PF Inv.  Market Slze  PF Inv.  Market  Size  PF Inv.  Market Size  PF Inv.  Market Size
(%)  (US$  MM)  (%)  M7  (%)  (US$  MM)  (%)  (US$  MM)  (%)  (US$  MM)
(2)  (1)  (2)  (US$  MM)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (1)
1992  7,025.0  26,277.3  496.0  18,326.0
1993  28,481.0  40,158.7  932.0  42,932.0
1994  0.9  27,623.0  0.3  46,915.8  0.0  954.8  4.3  720.3  0.0  36,529.0
1995  4.1  32,421.0  1.4  43,195.5  0.0  860.1  10.8  2,006.9  0.4  37.062.0
1996  7.1  39,461.0  1.4  53,575.9  50  559.5  14.1  2,937.5  2.3  44,358.0
1997  11.8  42,684.0  3.2  58,983.0
1998  14.7  39,221.0  4.7  45,292.0
1999  17.9  49,171.0  4.2  82,982.0
Source:  (1)  CNV
(2)  SAFJP
C. Peru
Year  Time  Deposits  Leasing Bonds  Corporate  Bonds  Equity
PF Inv.  Market Size  PF Inv.  Market  Size  PF Inv.  Market  Size  PF Inv.  Market Size
(%)  M7  (%)  (US$  MM)  (%)  (US$  MM)  (%)  (US$  MM)
(4)  (USS  MM)  (4)  (1)  (4)  (2)  (4)  (3)
(1)
1993  0.3  5,340.0  0.9  211.0  0.0  nva  0.0  5,084.0
1994  1.2  7,618.0  7.9  344.0  10.1  85.0  0.5  8,162 0
1995  1.7  9,480.0  8.7  599.0  26.4  209.1  0.9  11,701.0
1996  2.0  11,708.0  4.1  1,129.0  44.5  471.3  2.2  13,842.0
1997  2.8  13,511.0  5.7  1,728.0  45.0  699.0  3.0  17,383.0
1998  3.3  12,976.6  7.2  2,481.8  38.6  797.1  5.2  11,034.0
1999  4.4  12,591.5  11.4  2,305.6  38.3  851.5  6.7  13,407.0
2000  3.3  12,624.0  16.1  2,166.2  40 7  1,188.1  7.4  10,511.0
Source:  1993-1996, Ramos  (1999)
(1)  Since  1997,  S.B.S. Of Peru
(2)  Since 1997,  Banco Central  de Reserva del Peru
(3)  Since  1997,  Conasev
58Table 3
Number of different issuers in Pension  Fund Portfolios
A. Chile
Year  Stock  Corp.  Mortgage  Bonds by  Investment  Foreign  Derivatives'
Bonds  Bonds'  financial  Funds  Investmente
institucions'
1985  2  4  26
1986  5  4  23
1987  8  9  22
1988  8  15  22
1989  24  15
1990  32  24
1991  44  32
1992  53  33  21  13
1993  77  34  26  15  7  13
1994  79  39  26  16  10  18
1995  102  40  28  14  19  11
1996  117  40  30  14  19  52
1997  119  38  28  14  23  83
1998  116  39  29  14  23  84
1999  123  46  29  8  23  217  13
2000  107  40  30  6  23  244  23
Includes leasing bonds
2Includes subordinated bonds
3In 1997 includes  4 goverment  institutions, 59  investment  funds,  13  private  fiTrns and 7 financial  institutions
In  1998 includes  2 goverments  institutions, 70 investnent funds, 2 private firms and 10  financial institutions
In 1999 includes  19 governents  institutions,  155 investment  funds,  2 private firms and 41  financial  institutions
In 2000 includes  17 goverments  institutions, 208  investment funds, 2 private firms and 17 financial  institutions




Common  Corporate  Leasing  Subordinated  Mortage
Year  Stock  Bonds  Bonds  Bonds  Bonds
1994  3  2  13  2  4
1995  8  12  17  8  7
1996  12  15  20  14  7
1997  18  24  22  16  8
1998  18  22  20  15  8
1999  26  22  16  10  7
2000  23  22  14  7  7
5Authorized  Issuers
Source: Ramos,  1999.
Since 2000, SAFP
C. Argentina
Year  Stock  Corp.  Bank's  Investment  Foreing  Foreing  Derivatives




1994  15  9  8  8  0  5  0
1995  19  19  10  23  8  31  0
1996  28  30  9  44  4  14  0
1997  34  40  10  73  3  8  0
1998  36  42  13  100  1  3  1
1999  37  33  11  131  1  14  2
2000  35  31  4  130  0  68  1
6 Includes real estate investment funds
7Includes stocks and bonds
Source:  SAFJP
59TABLE 4
Market Capitalization versus Corporate Bonds  and Stocks  in Pension Funds Portfolios
(End of period, Million  US dollars)
Chile  Peru  Argentina
Year  Market  Corp.  Stocks  Total  Weight  Market  Corp.  Stocks  Total  Weight  Market  Corp.  Stocks  Total  Weight
Cap  Bonds  (3)  (4)=(2)+(3)  (4)/(1)  Cap  Bonds  (3)  (4)=(2)+(3)  (4)/(1)  Cap  (1)  Bonds  (3)  (4)=(2)+(3)  (4)/(1)
(1)  (2)  (%)  (1)  (2)  (%)  (2)  (%)
1981  2,670  2  0  2  0.1
1982  1,191  4  0  4  0.3
1983  791  25  0  25  3.2
1984  744  22  0  22  3.0
1985  932  17  0  17  1.8
1986  2,066  17  82  98  4.8
1987  2,833  69  167  236  8.3
1988  4,474  229  290  520  11.6
1989  6,102  407  451  858  14.1
1990  9,942  739  749  1,488  15.0
1991  19,098  1,121  2,399  3,520  18.4
1992  21,933  1,190  2,913  4,103  18.7
1993  28,595  1,164  5,085  6,249  21.9  2,351  0  0  0  0.0
1994  45,058  1,403  7,483  8,886  19.7  5,271  9  38  47  0.9  18,751  15  8  23  0.1
1995  48,070  1,333  7,642  8,975  18.7  7,353  60  105  166  2.3  22,148  171  146  317  1.4
1996  35,780  1,284  7,155  8,439  23.6  7,605  227  301  528  6.9  26,564  375  998  1,374  5.2
1997  44,498  1,012  7,212  8,224  18.5  9,657  343  526  869  9.0  35,142  226  1,894  2,120  6.0
1998  31,837  1,170  4,629  5,799  18.2  6,151  341  570  911  14.8  24,894  264  2,116  2,380  9.6
1999  42,639  1,312  4,299  5,611  13.2  7,583  414  900  1,314  17.3  23,319  331  3,449  3,780  16.2
2000  35,350  1,451  4,176  5,626  15.9  4,380  623  782  1,405  32.1  12,331  564  2,499  3,063  24.8
Sources:  IFC for the Market Caps and Pension  Fund Superintendencies.
60TABLE 5
STOCK MARKET INDICATORS
IFCG LATIN AMERICA  Argentina  Chile  Peru
ANNUAL  DIV.  ANNUAL  YIELD  ANNUAL  DIV.  ANNUAL  YIELD
Year  RETURN  P/E  P[BV  YIELD  (%)  RETURN  P/E  P/BV  (%)  RETURN  P/E*  P/BV*  YIELD(%)  RETURN  P/E  P/BV  (%)
1981  -0.53  -0.42
1982  -0.61  -0.55
1983  0.48  -0.32
1984  4.03  -0.18  0.14  -0.24  5.00
1985  0.66  4.74  0.75  0.7  0.49  7.48
1986  -0.02  3.53  0.58  4.34  -0.26  6.72  0.19  0.24  1.55  4.93  0.76  5.88
1987  -0.30  5.56  0.34  7.05  0.10  4.31  0.24  1.92  0.30  5.88  0.73  5.87
1988  0.70  4.00  0.51  5.02  0.39  3.23  0.26  3.62  0.37  3.67  0.73  9.38
1989  0.52  6.68  0.82  4.90  1.76  9.15  1.13  4.69  0.51  5.61  0.89  9.50
1990  -0.04  10.12  0.66  9.78  -0.37  NM  0.26  0.89  0.40  7.87  1.04  5.00
1991  1.24  17.54  1.41  1.53  3.97  NM  1.68  0.33  0.98  15.87  1.73  3.55
1992  0.06  19.45  1.04  1.89  -0.26  37.99  1.20  1.93  0.16  12.99  1.71  3.82  25.91  2.66  0.00
1993  0.57  18.42  1.31  2.10  0.73  41.90  1.94  2.28  0.35  20.04  2.11  2.74  0.37  44.01  3.62  0.79
1994  0.00  15.96  1.08  1.87  -0 23  17.71  1  42  2 91  0.45  21.38  2.51  2.41  0.53  43.15  3  100  0 7n
1995  -0.16  23.25  0.84  2.96  0.13  15.00  1.35  3.48  0.01  17.15  2.10  3.53  0.11  14.46  2.84  1.33
1996  0.19  16.17  1.11  2.46  0.22  38.21  1.62  2.95  -0.14  14.62  1.59  3.95  0.03  14.21  2.52  2.43
1997  0.29  15.08  1.47  2.84  0.20  16.34  1.81  2.09  0.07  14.67  1.64  3.92  0.17  13.97  1.98  2.30
1998  -0.36  11.58  0.91  5.08  -0.26  13.41  1.25  4.02  -0.27  15.14  1.11  4.11  -0.38  21.09  1.57  3.55
1999  0.62  19.79  1.66  2.37  0.38  39.36  1.52  3.21  0.40  34.97  1.68  3.00  0.24  25.69  1.48  2.15
2000  -0.13  14.04  1.40  2.89  -0.23  NM  0.93  3.45  -0.12  24.90  1.44  2.53  -0.25  11.60  1.09  5.50
Average  0.24  13.41  1.01  3.87  0.31  20.28  1.12  2.29  0.20  14.65  1.45  4.80  0.10  23.88  2.31  2.09
Source: IFC.
*  1987 corresponds to January,  1988
61TABLE 6
IMPACT OF PENSION  FUNDS  ON PRICE-TO-BOOK  RATIOS
A.  Least squares estimation
Argentina  Chile  Peru
Dependent Variable:  1990:12 1998:12  1986:03  1999:03  1993:02  1999:03
DLOG(PB)  Included observations: 97  Included  observations:  148  Included observations:  74
Constant  a,  0.0159  0.0170  0,0075  0.0074  0.0094  -0.0034  0.0022
t1-est*  0.9541  0.8825  1.0822  0.8751  1.0616  -0.3026  0.1928
DLOG(PB_LATI)  a,  0.9048  0.9011  0,1469  0.1469  0.1004  0.5447  0.53 14
4.8678  4.8203  1.7809  1.7760  1.1664  5.3549  5.1606
D(LPFInv*)  a,  -0.0005  -0.0008  0.3550  0.3556  0.3090  -0.0369  -0.0477
-0.0101  -0.0161  2.1249  2.0038  1.7250  -0.3257  -0.4299
D(LPB_LATI)*D(LPFinV)  a 3 -0.6670  -0.6564  -1.7240  -1.7255  -1.5494  -0.5134  -0.4363
-1.6917  -1.6783  -3.6618  -3.4402  -2.9011  -0.4251  -0.3582
ASIAN  CRISIS  -0.0065  0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0176
-0.3220  0.0306  -0.0038  -0.8756
ASIAN  CRISIS*DLOG(PB-LATI)  0.3180
1.6945
AR(I)  0.1182  0.1176  0.0837  0.0834  0.1097  -0.2256  -0.2320
1.4513  1.4346  0.8367  0.8240  1.0528  -1.8246  -1.9097
R-squared  0.3185  0.3 187  0.3720  0.3720  0.3899  0.2485  0.2562
Adjusted R-squared  0.2889  0.2813  0.3545  0.3499  0.3639  0.2049  0.2015
S.E. of regression  0.1265  0.1272  0.0756  0.0758  0.0750  0.0916  0.0918
Sum squared  resid  1.4719  1.4715  0.8169  0.8169  0.7936  0.5789  0.5729
Log likelihood  65.49  65.50  174.76  174.76  176.90  74.48  74.86
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.9260  1.9273  1.9440  1.9441  1.9533  1.9919  2.0123
F-statistic  10.7494  8.5141  21.1782  16.8244  15.0182  5.7032  4.6850
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0005  0.0010
B.  Pooled  estimation with flxed effects  and common changes  In level  and sensitivity
D(LPFInv*)  a  0.1004
t-test*  2  2.5915
D(LPB_LATI)*D(LPFinv)  a  -0.9609
(-test*  3  -6.3803
*White lleteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors and  Covariances
62TABLE 7
TRANSACTION COSTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Country Avgs.  Price  Commission  Fees  SubTotal  Rank  Mkt  Total  Rank
(BP)  (BP)  (BP)  (1=1ow)  Impact  (BP)  (I=low)
U.S.-OTC  $34.30  3.15  0.13  3.28  1  26.61  29.89  5
U.S.-NYSE  $41.06  13.92  0.15  14.07  2  9.48  23.55  2
India  $13.70  16.04  0  16.04  3  48.73  64.77  32
U.K.-Selis  $8.81  15.98  0.12  16.1  4  18.12  34.22  10
Japan-Buys  $14.73  17.12  0.03  17.15  5  1.09  18.24  1
Canada  $26.73  19.57  0.01  19.58  6  24.36  43.94  17
France  $95.22  21.68  1.29  22.97  7  3.59  26.56  3
Netherlands  $49.32  21.47  1.73  23.2  8  6.7  29.9  6
Belgium  $241.08  21.24  2.19  23.43  9  10.5  33.93  9
Chile  $24.39  23 04  0  30  1i  23 34  47.03  21
Germany  $87.48  22.45  1.65  24.1  11  3.48  27.58  4
Italy  $5.18  22.38  1.81  24.19  12  6.19  30.38  7
Denmark  $95.13  23.25  1.32  24.57  13  18.82  43.39  16
Sweden  $24.32  23.62  1.06  24.68  14  6.22  30.9  8
Spain  $33.58  25.12  2.01  27.13  15  15.91  43.04  15
Finland  $37.65  25.99  1.86  27.85  16  16,12  43.97  18
Norway  $20.78  26.97  1.26  28.23  17  8.14  36.37  12
Switzerland  $838.01  23.7  5.13  28.83  18  17.21  46.04  19
Japan-Sells  $11.01  16.89  13.57  30.46  19  5.83  36.29  11
Luxembourg  $53.22  25.82  5  30.82  20  39.22  70.04  33
New Zealanld  $2.23  30.85  0.27  31.12  21  7.81  38.93  13
Austria  $80.77  29.54  3.39  32.93  22  21.19  54.12  25
Portugal  $38.33  27.91  5.42  33.33  23  7.81  41.14  14
Mexico  $2.90  32.18  1.89  34.07  24  26.91  60.98  30
Brazil  $0.22  30.39  3.69  34.08  25  12.54  46.62  20
.agenitna  $4 61  34  73  5  19  3942  26  8  75  48 67  23
Turkey  $0.07  35.71  4.53  40.24  27  16.86  57.1  27
Total-45  $47.10  32.93  8.13  41.06  28  18.55  59.62  29
Hong Kong  $2.36  30.71  14.2  44.91  29  5.19  50.1  24
Australia  $3.95  30.78  14.13  44.91  30  2.13  47.04  22
South Africa  $9.22  29.26  16.07  45.33  31  13.17  58.5  28
Peru  S3.28  38 99  6  71  45.7  32  31u.27  75 97  36
Colombia  $4.83  48.09  0  48.09  33  47,01  95.1  39
Taiwan  $4.10  22.92  29.35  52.27  34  4,55  56.82  26
Greece  $44.60  39.25  14.03  53.28  35  10.33  63.61  31
Korea  $15.28  43.86  11.64  55.5  36  42.33  97.83  41
Singapore  $2.80  56.52  4.43  60.95  37  23.91  84.86  37
Thailand  $2.31  60.55  2.84  63.39  38  12.13  75.52  35
Czech Republic  $81.83  62.02  1.73  63.75  39  97,22  160.97  46
U.K.-Buys  $8.08  18.13  47.58  65.71  40  5.29  71  34
Hungary  $33.58  63.21  4.43  67.64  41  34.68  102.32  43
Malaysia  $1.32  62.67  9.45  72.12  42  18.71  90.83  38
Indonesia  $0.39  64.34  12.69  77.03  43  18.48  95.51  40
Ireland  $9.77  26  56.05  82.05  44  17.37  99.42  42
Philippines  $1.39  68.48  28.03  96.51  45  8.5  105.01  44
Venezuela  $5.61  84.92  27.77  112.69  46  32.04  144.73  45
*  Note:The  United States,  United  Kingdom, and Japan have two universes to acknowledge special  tar
and marketplaces  in those countries.
Source: ElkinsSMcSherryGlobal  Universe, Fourth Quarter, 1998.  Takenfrom the EmergingMarkets
Factbook (1998)
63TABLE 8
IMPACT  OF PENSION  FUND STOCK  INVESTMENT  ON VOLATILITY
A.  LEAST  SQUARES  ESTIMATION
Al. Unit root tests for 24 month  log volatilities
ARGENTINA  CHILE  PERU  ALL
COUNTRIES
ADF Test Statistic  -1.9900  -2.9763  -1.9261  -2.3094
1%  Critical Value  -3.4591  -3.4591  -3.5682  -3.4591
5%  Critical Value  -2.8737  -2.8737  -2.9215  -2.8737
10%  Critical Value  -2.5732  -2.5732  -2.5983  -2.5732
A2. Dendent Variable:  24 month  moving volatility (annualized  SD)
ARGENTINA  CHILE  PERU
Sample(adjusted):  1979:02  1979:02  1995:01
1998:12  1999:03  1999:03
Included observations:  239  242  51
Constant  d,  0.0241  0.0859  -0.4063
t-test*  0.0909  1.4187  -0.2762
Avg. 24 mo. volatility  d  1.6449  0.6458  1.0916
(All  IFC countries)
t-test  3.8580  4.3651  3.7168
LPFlnv*  d2  -0.0137  -0.0071  -0.0020
t-test  -1.0990  -2.0994  -0.4306
AR(1)  0.9810  0.9355  0.9922
t-test  66.7916  42.0961  31.9781
MA(1)  0.1643  -0.0660  -0.4231
t-test  1.1202  -1.2217  -2.7085
R-squared  0.9726  0.9590  0.9608
Adjusted R-squared  0.9721  0.9583  0.9574
S.E.  of regression  0.0518  0.0143  0.0180
Sum squared resid  0.6285  0.0487  0.0149
Log likelihood  370.81  686.49  135.21
Durbin-Watson stat  1.9262  2.0154  2.0243
F-statistic  2074.82  1384.24  281.86
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
*White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors  and Covariance
A3. Unit Root Tests for Residuals
ADF Test Statistic  -2.6509  -3.7345  -2.9815
1  %  Critical Value  -3.4597  -3.4593  -3.5653
5%  Critical Value  -2.8739  -2.8738  -2.9202
10% Critical Value  -2.5733  -2.5732  -2.5977




B. ARCH  ESTIMATION
ARGENTINA  CHILE  PERU
Sample:  1985:02  1985:02  1993:02
1998:12  1998:12  1998:12
Included observations:  167  167  71
BI. Expected Retum Equation
Constant  bo  -0.0209  -0.0128  0.0146
t-test  -1.4652  -1.0588  1.2250
Own  Return (-1)  b  -0.1143  0.1202  0.1743
t-test  -5.6299  1.7269  1.9006
Return Latam  IFC  Index  b2  0.8714  0.4468  0.7240
t-test  20.0893  9.6843  6.4677
Dividend Yield (-12)  b3 0.0070  0.0049  -0.0092
t-test  1.3149  2.0401  -1.7630
B2. Variance  Equation
Constant  c  0.0222  0.0089  0.0037
t-test  °  9.5717  2.7904  2.1077
ARCH(1)  c  0.8523  -0.0108  0.3752
t-test  6.3126  -0.0973  1.2190
LPFInv*  c  -0.0029  -0.0006  -0.0006
t-test  2 -9.6571  -1.6437  -1.7616
R-squared  0.0670  0.2883  0.4607
Adjusted R-squared  0.0320  0.2616  0.4007
S.E.  of regression  0.2083  0.0698  0.0750
Sum squared resid  6.9391  0.7803  0.3542
Log likelihood  89.92  215.10  96.53
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.0313  1.8822  2.5168
F-statistic  1.9147  10.8025  7.6871
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0815  0.0000  0.0000
65TABLE 9
IMPACT  OF PENSION  FUNDS  STOCK INVESTMENT  ON TRADED VOLUMES
LEAST SQUARES  ESTIMATION:  TRADED VOLUMES
1. Unit root tests for log monthly traded volumes in stocks
ARGENTINA  CHILE  PERU  L.A.
COUNTRIES
ADF  Test Statistic  -2.8724  -3.0681  -2.7555  -2.0269
1%  CrificalValue  -4.0152  -4.0152  -4.0909  -4.0155
5%  Critical Value  -3.4373  -3.4373  -3.4730  -3.4374
10%  Critical Value  -3.1426  -3.1426  -3.1635  -3.1427
2. Dendent  Variable:  log of monthly traded  volumes
ARGENTiNA  CHILE  PERU
Sample:  1985:02  1985:02  1994:01
1998:12  1998:12  1998:12
Included observations:  167  167  60
Constant  -1.8540  -1.1846  2.2483
t-test*  eo  -1.6525  -2.1061  1.7387
Trend  e  0.0327  0.0089  0.0044
t-test  e  4.8897  2.2725  0.5297
LOG(VLMLATI)  e 2 0.2374  0.2504  0.2131
t-test  1.9284  2.2748  1.6154
LOG(12m total  rtetum)  e 3 0.7843  0.4283  0.4467
t-test  4.9697  1.9701  1.6274
LPFInv*  e  0.1241  0.3260  0.0155
t-test  -1.5358  4.4992  0.2353
AR(1)  0.8346  0.6621  -0.0334
t-test  15.0204  5.2753  -0.0731
MA(1)  -0.0803  -0.1763  0.3626
t-test  -0.8305  -0.9879  0.7935
R-squared  0.9431  0.9469  0.5742
Adjusted R-squared  0.9410  0.9449  0.5169
S.E. of regression  0.4285  0.3765  0.2449
Sum  squared resid  29.3801  22.6831  3.1193
Log  likelihood  -91.87  -70.27  3.57
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.0023  1.9349  2.0332
F-statistic  442.21  475.35  10.02
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
'White  Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors and Covariance
-includes a dummy variable for October 1995, since it is an  outlier.
3.  Unit Root Tests of Residuals
ADF Test Statistic  -2.9640  -3.6450  -4.5946
1  % Critical Value  -3.4715  -4.0168  -3.5457
5%  Critical Value  -2.8792  -3.4381  -2.9118
10% Critical Value  -2.5761  -3.143  -2.5932
4.  Pooled Estimation
LPFInv*  0.1491
t-test  e4  3.3278
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IMPACT OF PENSION  FUNDS ON FIRM'S  COST OF CAPITAL
(GLS,  Cross Section Weights)
Panel L  Dependent variable: Log of  Dividend Yield
Pension Funds:  A.  Dummy  B.  Assets  C. Share_Priv  D.  Log(lnv_stocks
-0.2621  -0.0086  -0.0130  -0.0365
-2.8835  -2.6465  -2.0756  -2.4654
Inflation  3.3600  6.3400  5.6900  6.0100
0.1529  0.2869  0.2563  0.2718
Income  -2.8600  9.8200  3.7700  1.1400
-0.1274  0.4012  0.1525  0.4531
Bank_Assets  0.3490  0.2924  0.2647  0.2833
2.0052  1.6874  1.4998  1.6211
InitiaLidvy  0.6273  0.6878  0.6619  0.6879
11.5090  9.1954  8.5982  8.8307
Region  -0.3829  -0.3836  -0.4349  -0.3727
-1.8468  -1.8402  -2.0598  -1.7426
No. Observations  146  146  146  146
R-squared  0.8431  0.8849  0.8438  0.8636
Adjusted R-squared  0.8277  0.8735  0.8284  0.8501
S.E.  Of regression  0.5859  0.5917  0.5948  0.5921
F-statistic  54.5963  78.0418  54.8780  64.2890
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note:  t-statistics in italic.
68TABLE  11  (Cont.)
IMPACT  OF PENSION FUNDS  ON FIRM'S COST  OF CAPITAL
(GLS,  Cross Section  Weights)
Panel 11. Dependent variable: Log of  Price to Book Ratio
Pension Funds:  A.  Dummy  B. Assets  C. Share_Priv  D. Log(Inv_stocks
0.1762  0.0092  0.0163  0.0402
2.4765  3.8145  3.3760  3.7484
Inflation  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0005
-6.3493  -6.0814  -6.3044  -6.3434
Income  -4.9100  4.5600  -4.6700  -5.6100
-3.6113  -3.3406  -3.4879  -4.2143
Bank_Assets  -0.2727  -0.3609  -0.3529  -0.3255
-2.4034  -3.1341  -3.0675  -2.8655
Initial_dvy  0.4436  0.5172  0.5129  0.5128
7.4026  8.3808  8.2637  8.3183
Region  -0.3259  -0.2502  -0.2598  -0.3260
-2.0339  -1.5981  -1.6709  -2.1098
No. Observations  147  147  147  147
R-squared  0.6914  0.7204  0.7175  0.7249
Adjusted R-squared  0.6612  0.6930  0.6899  0.6980
S.E.  Of regression  0.4198  0.4162  0.4169  0.4162
F-statistic  22.9215  26.3566  25.9910  26.9666
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note:  t-statistics in italic.
69TABLE 12
IMPACT  OF PENSION  FUNDS  ON MARKET VOLATILITY
(GLS,  Cross Section  Weights)
Dependent variable: 24 month moving volatility
Pension  Funds:  A.  Dummy  B.  Assets  C. Share_Priv  D. Log(lnv_stock:
-0.0658  -0.0016  -0.0031  -0.0088
-4.1034  -2.6997  -3.0232  -2.7795
Inflation  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002
3.4499  3.3432  3.3562  3.5446
Income  -1.1600  -7.8700  -7.5300  -6.8000
-2.7186  -1.6042  -1.5655  -1.4799
Bank_Assets  -0.0290  -0.0366  -0.0358  -0.0411
-0.8603  -1.0684  -1.0492  -1.2170
Initial_dvy  0.3076  0.3169  0.3169  0.3128
5.9056  5.6979  5.7657  6.0089
Region  -0.0024  0.0003  0.0048  0.0120
-0.0592  0.0071  0.1114  0.2882
No. Observations  147  147  147  147
R-squared  0.6826  0.5723  0.5824  0.5505
Adjusted  R-squared  0.6515  0.5304  0.5416  0.5066
S.E. Of regression  0.1475  0.1478  0.1472  0.1448
F-statistic  21.9981  13.6893  14.2713  12.5332
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note:  t-statistics in italic.
70TABLE 13
IMPACT  OF  PENSION  FUNDS  ON  FIRM'S COST OF  CAPITAL
(GLS,  Cross Section Weights)
Panel I.  Dependent variable: Log of Dividend Yield
pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed
Pension  Funds:  A.  Dummy  B.  Assets  C. Share_Priv  D. Log(lnv_stocks)
0.1477  0.4268  0.0079  -0.0223  0.0176  0.0953  0.0485  0.1926
0.7880  1.3091  1.1824  -0.9974  1.4319  2.6878  1.7889  3.6853
Refcap  -1.6176  -1.0166  -1.6395  1.2278  -1.6455  0.8789  -1.6711  2.3426
-2.3603  -0.3053  -2.4105  0.3603  -2.4409  0.2710  -2.5596  0.3071
Refcom  4.7821  1.6200  4.5450  0.5626  4.1965  0.8306  3.5455  -1.5413
1.7611  0.4101  1.6937  0.1404  1.5517  0.2081  1.3122  -0.3645
Reffin  -0.8513  0.1214  -1.1205  0.2372  -1.1018  0.0629  -1.0325  -0.1778
-1.0583  0.1118  -1.4167  0.2585  -1.3761  0.0691  -1.3168  -0.1749
Refpri  0.5417  6.3261  0.8803  7.3636  0.8901  4.4577  0.7669  5.1966
0.8212  2.0209  1.3113  2.3018  1.3248  1.5078  1.1864  1.7579
Reftax  1.0636  0.8460  0.5469  -0.0503  0.3845  1.4598  0.3836  1.9101
1.0893  0.4864  0.5225  -0.0259  0.3553  0.8324  0.3705  1.1747
No. Observations  53  54  54  54  54  54  54  54
R-squared  0.72888  0.7599  0.6975  0.8401  0.767  0.9157  0.7458  0.7569
Adjusted R-squared  0.6385  0.6217  0.5967  0.7481  0.6919  0.8683  0.661  0.6170
S.E.  Of regression  0.5657  0.5277  0.5696  0,5309  0.4042  0.3170  0.5602  0.4995
F-statistic  8.0655  8.7074  6.9190  14.4580  10.158  30.7881  8.8027  8.5645
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note:  t-statistics  in ithatic.
71TABLE  13 (Cont.)
IMPACT OF PENSION  FUNDS ON FIRM'S COST OF CAPITAL
(GLS,  Cross Section Weights)
Panel IU. Dependent variable: Log of  Price to Book Ratio
pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed
Pension  Funds:  A.  Dummy  B.  Assets  C.  Share_Priv  D.  Log(/nv_stocks)
0.3962  -0.2187  0.0187  0.0025  0.0360  -0.0209  0.0709  0.0067
2.6571  -1.2208  4.2229  0.1945  4.3071  -1.1646  3.6697  0.2066
Refcap  1.2623  -0.0076  1.4013  0.4874  1.2989  0.1191  1.2149  0.8146
2.1196  -0.0044  2.5801  0.2688  2.4663  0.0685  2.2163  0.4441
Refcom  3.5093  -1.1873  1.5328  -1.4656  1.3549  -0.9783  2.2600  -1.6740
1.9829  -0.5565  0.9742  -0.6999  0.8463  -0.4592  1.2936  -0.7617
Reffin  0.0665  -0.6052  -0.5717  -0.6356  -0.4876  -0.6500  -0.4553  -0.6232
0.0793  -0.8426  -0.9156  -0.7554  -0.7948  -0.7699  -0.6864  -0.7325
Refpri  -0.0014  -1.6179  0.7590  -1.2126  0.7114  -1.1672  0.4421  -1.1907
-0.0023  -0.8982  1.5073  -0.6893  1.4386  -0.7072  0.8630  -0.6894
Reftax  -2.0070  -0.8571  -2.7689  -0.9546  -2.9583  -1.0831  -2.4361  -0.9526
-2.3753  -0.8187  -3.6624  -0.8920  -3.8216  -1.0848  -3.0431  -0.9296
No. Observations  54  54  54  54  54  54  54  54
R-squared  0.6821  0.8829  0.7750  0.8982  0.767  0.9157  0.7479  0.8945
Adjusted  R-squared  0.5788  0.8175  0.7019  0.8413  0.6919  0.8683  0.6659  0.8356
S.E.  Of regression  0.4307  0.3139  0.4147  0.3211  0.4042  0.3170  0.4172  0.3210
F-statistic  6.6043  21.3748  10.6010  25.0127  10.158  30.7881  9.1285  24.0290
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note:  t-statistics in italic.
72TABLE 14
IMPACT OF  PENSION FUNDS  ON MARKET VOLATILITY
(GLS,  Cross Section Weights)
Dependent variable: 24 month moving volatility
pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed  pooled  fixed
Pension Funds:  A.  Dummy  B. Assets  C.  Share_Priv  D. Log(lnv_stocks)
-0.0593  -0.1193  0.0015  0.0047  0.0009  -0,0038  0.0016  -0.0090
-1.4882  -1.0530  1.1861  1.0002  0.3569  -0.6696  -0.2699  -0.8299
Refcap  0.3706  0.4111  0.4957  0.3194  0.4684  0.4937  0.4442  0.2381
2.1461  0.5181  2.9643  0.3746  2.7912  0.5954  2.6174  0.2838
Refcom  -3.6578  -3.7925  -4.5774  -3.7938  4.3374  -4.0124  -4.0938  -3.7056
-7.9759  -4.7637  -10.0534  -4.4244  -8.8785  -5.0043  -8.3559  -4.5356
Reffin  -0.1414  0.1875  -0.0998  0.1045  -0.1014  0.1251  -0.1016  0.1102
-0.5472  0.4429  -0.4355  0.2386  -0.4373  0.3242  -0.4294  0.2726
Refpri  -0.3089  0.8311  -0.3624  0.6466  -0.3750  0.7037  -0.3792  0.7333
-1.6549  1.4132  -2.2456  1.2036  -2.3202  1.2568  -2.3127  1.2142
Reftax  0.8117  0.2271  0.8093  0.4484  0.8471  0.3391  0.8703  0.2635
4.4930  0.7391  4.5676  1.4041  4.6772  1.0954  4.8236  0.8335
No. Observations  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52
R-squared  0.9136  0.9424  0.9281  0.9440  0.92977  0.971102  0.9241  0.9098
Adjusted R-squared  0.884  0.9083  0.9035  0.9120  0.9057  0.9539  0.8981  0.8562
S.E. Of regression  0.1496  0.1393  0.1456  0.1536  0.1498  0.1397  0.1500  0.1367
F-statistic  30.9124  43.6820  37.7690  45.6340  38.701  89.6113  35.6096  26.9010
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note:  t-statistics in italic.
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25  Saudi Arabia
26  Slovakia
27  South Africa
28  Sri Lanka
29  Taiwan,  China
30  Thailand
3 1  Turkey
32  Venezuela
33  Zimbabwe
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Summary  Findings
The creation of fully funded,  privately managed  pension systems may
have significant positive direct effects on savings, growth,  and welfare.
However,  the indirect link, via capital market development,  may be as
important. This hypothesis  is verified with evidence from emerging
economies that  have recently engaged in such  reforms with a focus on
Chile, Argentina  and Peru. There is abundant qualitative and anecdotal
evicdence that  relates pension  reform  with the accumulation of
"institutional capital", with the existence of an adaptive legal framework,
with increased specialization, transparency  and integrity and even with
bett,er corporate governance.  Evidence of increased financial  innovation
is also found while there  is little evidence of bank disintermediation.
In  addition, time-series  and panel  data evidence is generally consistent
with the following hypothetical effects: a reduction  in the cost of capital;
lower security-price volatility; and  higher traded volumes. The evidence
suggests that the indirect channel  via capital market development may
have  important  implications for economic growth and productivity.
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